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QoS based Route Management in Cognitive Radio Networks 
Saed Alrabaee 
 
Cognitive radio networks are smart networks that automatically sense the channel and 
adjust the network parameters accordingly. Cognitive radio is an emerging technology that 
enables the dynamic deployment of highly adaptive radios that are built upon software defined 
radio technology. The radio technology allows the unlicensed operation to be in the licensed 
band. The cognitive radio network paradigm therefore raises many technical challenges such as 
the power efficiency, spectrum management, spectrum detection, environment awareness, the 
path selection as well as the path robustness, and security issues. 
Traditionally, in the routing approaches in the wired network, each node allows a 
maximum load through the selected route while traditionally in the routing approaches in 
wireless network, each node broadcasts its request with the identification of the required 
destination. However, the existing routing approaches in cognitive radio networks (CRN) follow 
the traditional approaches in wireless network especially those applied for ad hoc networks. In 
addition, these traditional approaches do not take into account spectrum trading as well as 
spectrum competition among licensed users (PUs).  
In this thesis, a novel QoS based route management approach is proposed by introducing 
two different models; the first model is without game theory and the second model is with game 
theory. The proposed QoS routing algorithm contains the following elements: (i) a profile for 
each user, which contains different parameters such as the unlicensed user (secondary user, SU) 
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identification, number of neighbors, channel identification, neighbor identification, probabilities 
of idle slots and the licensed user (primary user, PU) presence. In addition, the radio 
functionality feature for CRN nodes gives the capability to sense the channels and therefore each 
node shares its profile with the sensed PU, which then exchanges its profile with other PUs, (ii) 
spectrum trading, a PU calculates its price based on the SU requirements, (iii) spectrum 
competition,  a new coefficient α is defined that controls the price because of competition among 
PUs and depends on many factors such as the number of primary users, available channels, and 
duration of the usage, (iv) a new function called QoS function is defined to provide different 
levels of quality of service to SUs, and (v) the game theory concept adds many features such as 
the flexibility, the dynamicity in finding solutions to the model and the dynamic behaviors of 
users. Based on the previous elements, all possible paths are managed and categorized based on 
the level of QoS requested by SUs and the price offered by the PU. The simulation results show 
that the aggregate throughput and the average delay of the routes determined by the proposed 
QoS routing algorithm are superior to existing wireless routing algorithms. Moreover, network 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) is a revolutionary technology, which aims at enhancing the 
efficiency of spectrum usage. In a cognitive radio network, there are two kinds of users;  the 
unlicensed users (secondary users, SUs) have the possibility of using large amounts of unused 
spectrum in an efficient way while reducing interference with other licensed users (primary 
users, PUs) [1]. Moreover, the spectrum can be traded between PUs who are the spectrum 
owners, and SUs who are the spectrum leasers, in order to maximize the utility (profit) of 
primary users while maximizing the utility (QoS level) of secondary users. There might be more 
than one primary user that offers an affordable price as well as a good quality spectrum and 
therefore, the competition will be advantageous to the primary users and secondary users. 
However, secondary users in cognitive radio networks (CRN) require the ability to deal with 
different frequency bands and effectively adapt their configuration to changes in the radio 
environment without interrupting the normal operation of the spectrum owner. The radio nature, 
mobility nature, channel availability, and PUs’ presence behavior of PUs may vary with 
locations, time and frequency bands. This is what sets cognitive radio networks apart from other 
wireless networks.  
In this thesis, the spectrum management, which consists of spectrum trading between PUs and 
SUs, and spectrum competition among PUs on one side and among SUs on the other side, and 
the related routing issues, are addressed. As a result, two models are proposed; the first being the 
model without applying the game theory concept, and the second being the model with applying 
the game theory concept. Each model is applied into the proposed QoS routing algorithm. In the 
first model, new dynamic equations are introduced in order to control the behaviors of users in 
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the network. In the second model, game theory is used to control the dynamic behavior of 
primary users as well as secondary users.  Basically, both models are applied into the proposed 
QoS routing algorithm in order to improve the network performance. In this chapter, the 
definitions of CRN as well as the game theory concept are reviewed. The motivation of the 
proposed work is presented. The objectives and contributions of this research are listed. Finally, 
an organization section is added to describe the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 What is the Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) 
Nowadays, there is an unexpected explosion in the demand for wireless network resources. 
This is due to the dramatic increase in the number of the emerging web-based services. For 
wireless computer networks, limited bandwidth along with the transmission quality requirements 
for users, make quality of service (QoS) provisioning a very challenging problem. Many factors 
motivate the development of new algorithms and protocols to exploit the limited available 
spectrum. These factors include spectrum scarcity, the inefficiency in the spectrum usage and the 
remarkable increase in the number of devices that contend for spectrum [1-3]. The unlicensed 
users (secondary users) have the possibility of utilizing the large amount of unused spectrum in a 
smart way while reducing the interference with other licensed users (primary users). Moreover, 
cognitive radio networks are smart networks that automatically sense the channel and adjust the 
network parameters accordingly. Cognitive radio is an emerging technology that enables the 
dynamic deployment of highly adaptive radios that are built upon software defined radio 
technology. The radio technology allows the unlicensed operation to be in the licensed band. The 
cognitive radio network paradigm therefore raises many technical challenges such as the power 
efficiency, spectrum management, spectrum detection, environment awareness, distributed 
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spectrum measurements, the route selection as well as the route robustness, and the security 
issues like the unauthorized intrusion and malicious users. 
1.2 What is Game Theory 
Game theory is a part of applied mathematics which is concerned with how rational objects 
make decisions in a situation of conflict. It is a rich mathematical tool that helps us to 
understand, to analyze, and to model the interaction among rational entities. Game theory has 
been largely used in Economics. It has also been used in other disciplines such as Biology, 
Political science, Engineering, and Philosophy. One of the main areas in Engineering where 
game theory has been applied is data communication networking. [4, 5]. During the late 1940s, 
cooperative game theory had come into being, which analyzes optimal strategies for groups of 
individuals, assuming that they can enforce collaboration between them so as to jointly improve 
their positions in a game. In early 1950s, J. Nash developed a new criterion, known as Nash 
equilibrium, to characterize mutually consistent strategies of players. During the 1950s, many 
important concepts of game theory were developed, such as the concepts of the core, the 
extensive form games, repeated games, and the Shapley value. During the 1960s, Bayesian 
games were proposed. Application of game theory to biology, i.e., the evolutionary game theory, 
was introduced by J. M. Smith in the 1970s. Recently, game theory has been used in the 
communication area [6-8]. In particular, it has been used to model and analyze resource 
allocation problems in a competitive environment, and more. In addition, it has also been used 
for security issues. The cognitive radio network becomes the focal part in the wireless network 




1.3 Motivation and Application 
Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) has been widely studied to solve the frequency scarcity 
problem through dynamic spectrum access [1]. Traditionally, rigid allocation policies by FCC 
have severely hindered the efficient utilization of a scarce spectrum. Hence, dynamic spectrum 
access, with the aid of cognitive radio technology [2], has become a talented approach by 
breaking the paradigm and enabling wireless devices to utilize the spectrum adaptively and 
efficiently. Emerging wireless technologies such as cognitive radio network (CRN) make 
dynamic spectrum allocation a reality. CRNs are able to provide greater flexibility and access to 
spectrum, and improve the spectrum utilization by searching and utilizing radio resources 
efficiently. However, there are several open research challenges that motivate our work. These 
challenges include: 
1- Spectrum Trading: The spectrum in CRN is a limited natural resource and there are no ways 
to increase it. In order to solve the spectrum scarcity problem, new solutions for spectrum 
management should be presented. Unfortunately, the static nature of the previous schemes 
prevents them from utilizing the unused spectrum efficiently. In this thesis, the new 
algorithm is developed to manage the spectrum portions as well as to classify these portions 
according to proposed QoS levels. As a result, the spectrum is traded, which allows SUs to 
access the unused spectrum using overlay by paying a price.     
2- Spectrum Competition: Recently, there has been an incredible increase in the number of 
electronic devices that demand spectrum access. In order to manage the competition among 
these huge numbers of users, a new factor is proposed, which is called Competition Factor 
and game theory is incorporated to ensure the flexibility of this work. Users can access the 
unused spectrum dynamically by using the proposed game theory schemes.  
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3- Quality of Services (QoS): despite the fact that the research in cognitive radio has been 
increased in recent years, QoS area on cognitive radios network is still immature. This point 
motivates our work to consider the QoS in this work. Therefore, three QoS levels are 
proposed in our work by defining a new function called a QoS level function. The first level 
represents the delay, the second level represents the primary user presence, and the third level 
represents Expected Transmission Count (ETX). The significance of the QoS levels will be 
described in detail later. 
4- Routing Management: in cognitive radio network the vital issues that affect the network 
performance are the node mobility, the primary users’ presence, and the availability of 
spectrum or channel. These issues degrade the network performance. The traditional routing 
algorithms such as shortest hop, ad-hoc on-demand routing protocol (AODV), and greedy 
algorithm are less efficient in terms of delay and throughput when they are applied in 
cognitive radio networks. This motivates us to find solution to improve the network 
performance. 
5- Game Theory: recently, game theory concept has been used in the communication area [12]. 
Basically, it has been used to model and analyze resource allocation problems in competitive 
area and it has also been used for security issues. The cognitive radio network is the focal 
part in the wireless network and game theory has also been applied to cognitive radio 
networks [9]. Hence, the applying of game theory concept to our proposed model is another 
objective of this work.    
1.4 List of Challenges 
This thesis consists of two models; the first model is without game theory and the second 
model is with game theory. In the latter model, a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is the solution of 
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the proposed model, is obtained. The challenge in doing so is that, since prices can take values 
from a continuous set, the strategy sets of primaries are unaccountably infinite. So it is not a 
priori clear whether a Nash Equilibrium exists, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a 
Nash Equilibrium. In the first model, new equations are introduced to balance the PU’s revenues 
and the QoS for SUs. The proposed models are designed to provide a scheme to help the PUs to 
adapt to the changing spectrum market conditions which include traffic load at PUs, spectrum 
price offered and current cost of spectrum. In addition, due to many characteristics of cognitive 
radio network (CRN) such as the complexity of cognitive radios network, mobility nature, and 
primary user presence, developing routing algorithm in such networks becomes one of the 
greatest challenges. The main challenges for routing algorithm in Cognitive Radio include: 
1) Spectrum: When an efficient route algorithm solution is to be designed, the algorithm 
must be aware of the surrounding physical environment to take more precise decisions.  
2) Quality: the routing solution is greatly influenced by PUs’ behavior. So, the quality 
measurement of end to end route should be tied with path stability as well as path 
availability. 
3) Maintenance: It might require restoring the failure path by using the effective signaling 
procedures. Meanwhile it is required to achieve minimal effect on the quality of routing. 
To avoid the maintenance in the proposed algorithm, the profile for each user, which 
consists of all information related to the spectrum or channel, gives the ability to predict 
the health of the path in advance. 
4) Cost: Balance the PU’s revenues and the QoS for SUs. A scheme is proposed to help the 
PUs to adapt to the changing spectrum market conditions, which include traffic load at 
PUs, spectrum price offered and current cost of spectrum.   
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Specifically, the primary differences and challenges between routing of CRNs and routing of 
other wireless network such as ad-hoc or sensor was discussed by [3] and it can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) Link availability:  CRN links are available under idle duration of the primary user(s) so 
that Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) can effectively fetch such opportunities, after 
successful spectrum sensing.  Links in the CRN can vary much more rapidly because link 
available duration is only a fraction of the inter-arrival time for traffic and signaling 
packets. 
2) Unidirectional links: Typically wireless networks have bi-directional links, because radio 
communication is half-duplex. However, in CRNs, unidirectional links are more likely to 
be the case due to the fact that a CR node may just have an opportunity to transmit in one 
time duration and there is no guarantee to allow the opportunity for transmission from the 
other direction. 
3) Heterogeneous wireless networks: In contrast to typical wireless ad-hoc or sensor 
networks, CRNs are generally formed by heterogeneous wireless networks (co-existing 
primary systems and CR nodes to form ad-hoc networks). However, CR links might be 
available for an extremely short duration and the successful networking lies in 
cooperative relaying among such heterogeneous wireless networks. It is not good in 
terms of security because it is not possible for a CR node to get a secure certificate within 
the short opportunistic window. 
4) Efficiency: It can find some frequency spectrum, which is not occupied or only partially 
occupied. The unlicensed user, called secondary user (SU) or cognitive user (CU), can 
have access to such a spectrum, and the utilization will be improved greatly. 
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1.5 Problem Statement 
A CRN allows SU to operate on the vacant parts of the spectrum allocated to PU. Due to the 
nature of radio networks, the users have the ability to sense the licensed channels. As a result, 
many SUs can sense the same channel (spectrum), which opens the door for the competition 
between SUs on the one side and between PUs (spectrum owners) on the other side. For primary 
users, the competition is to get more demand. In addition, the mobility of nodes, either PU or SU, 
could affect the network topology as well as the network performance. Moreover, the possibility 
of new users to join the network and the ability to sense the existing spectrum, make the routing 
in radio environment a problematic. The problem can be divided into three parts: the first part is 
to find efficient and dynamic equations for spectrum management. The second part is to obtain 
the Nash Equilibrium for each proposed game scheme. The third part is to apply the both models 
(with/without game theory) into proposed QoS based route management algorithm. 
1.6 Objectives and Contributions of the Proposed Research 
This section includes in detail the objectives and contributions of this work. Some research 
questions are presented to guide us to specify our objectives precisely. 
1.6.1 Research Objectives 
The major objective of this work is to propose new schemes to manage the spectrum efficiently 
and to maximize the network performance. In the first part, the objective of the first phase is to 
manage the spectrum and to control the behavior of SUs while of the second phase is to select a 
path as per SU’s requirement and to give the SU a choice to specify its level of QoS. In the 
second part, the game theory concept is used to model the dynamic behaviors among PUs and 
the relation between PU and SU is modeled.  To achieve this goal methodologies and 
9 
 
mechanisms are developed to enable our system to interact with changes in wireless 
environment. Efforts will be geared towards the following tasks: 
1) To design a new QoS based Route Management algorithm that achieves the following 
objectives: 
 To increase throughput of CRN by reducing the communication overhead and 
broadcasting in the CRN by defining a profile for each user. 
 To decrease the delay in the cognitive radio network by providing path with more 
idle slots in each link in the path. Efficient equations are introduced to calculate 
the delay in the link. 
 The mobility of SUs should also be considered properly by updating the proposed 
profile table periodically. 
 The presence of PUs should also be considered properly by providing a new 
constraint called probability of PU presence. 
 
2) To develop the functions for the spectrum trading competition. These functions include: 
 Base Station Cost paid by a primary user to the base station. 
 Intermediate Cost paid to each intermediate node in the selected path. 
 Price Function calculated by primary user based on SU requirements as well as 
the previous costs. 
 Profit Function calculated by PU to get the net revenue of its service. 
3) To consider the requirements of SUs while maximizing the revenue of PU. 
4) To provide different levels of QoS that gives the chance for SU to choose the best one for 
its requirement. 
5) To provide different options for path based on SU’s requirement as well as the price. 
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6) To propose game theory schemes in order to model the dynamic behaviors of PUs and 
SUs. Three kinds of game models are proposed; the first scheme is to model the 
competition among PUs, the second scheme is to model the relation between PU and SU, 
and the third scheme is to model the spectrum selection among SUs. The proposed 
schemes are described in detail in Chapter 4.  
1.6.2 Key Contribution 
Much research has been conducted on the CRN especially for spectrum trading, spectrum 
competition, and routing algorithm. Most of this research focuses on spectrum trading and 
spectrum competition without considering the routing issue. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no game theory framework ever proposed for routing in cognitive radio network from the 
system point of view. Therefore, the goal is to propose a complete system where spectrum 
trading, spectrum competition, QoS levels, path selection, routing algorithm, and game theory 
are considered. With this goal in mind, the contributions on different aspects of cognitive radio 
network are presented as follows: 
 A new scheme for trading free spectrum to SUs is proposed. In spectrum trading, the 
objective of a PU is to maximize its revenue, while that of a SU is to get a service from 
this spectrum. 
 A new factor called the Competition Factor for the spectrum competition among PUs is 
introduced. This factor relates to many parameters such as the availability of spectrum, 
the number of primary users, the usage period, and the number of secondary users. 
 A multiple levels of QoS are proposed to get more quality service; a function called QoS 
level function is introduced, which relates to the spectrum. 
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 A new idea of defining profile for each secondary user is introduced that contains the 
user ID and parameters of its channel. 
 Manage all profiles in a table called Profile Table. This helps in finding the best choice 
for SU. 
 Apply both models, with and without game theory, for routing algorithm in cognitive 
radio network and measure the network performance. 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: The literature review of the pricing, the spectrum 
trading, the spectrum competition, and the QoS routing in CRN are discussed in Chapter 2. The 
system requirements for the QoS routing algorithm are defined in Chapter 3. The system models 
with/without game theory are described in Chapter 4. The performance evaluation is presented in 
Chapter 5. The conclusion of the thesis and future work is presented in Chapter 6.  
1.8 Summary 
In this Chapter, the cognitive radio network and the concept of game theory were presented. In 
addition, the motivations, the objective, and the contributions of this thesis were highlighted. 
Moreover, the challenges were listed and the problem statement was defined. In next Chapter, 
literature reviews of pricing techniques, spectrum trading, spectrum competition, QoS routing, 







Chapter 2: Background and State-of-the-art  
 
Earlier works on the fundamentals for this work is reviewed in this chapter. Firstly, both the 
static scheme and the dynamic scheme of the pricing techniques are studied. Secondly, the state 
of the art in spectrum trading and competition on cognitive radio network are reviewed. Thirdly, 
related area of routing in cognitive radio network is reviewed. The chapter is concluded with a 
presentation of the state of the art to fusing game theory in cognitive radio network. 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Pricing Techniques 
In this section, the concept of price is introduced followed by the description of static and 
dynamic price and a review of pricing in cognitive radio network. 
2.1.1.1 Introduction 
Pricing is one technique that can be used for the design of a mechanism to adjust the usage of 
radio resources by the wireless nodes by amending their costs. However, the price technique is 
considered a control tool whereas the behavior of nodes is controlled by changing the price of 
path or spectrum according to the node’s actions. In our model many factors based on secondary 
user’s requirements will affect the price function such as the spectrum allocation, the path 
robustness, the path availability, the path stability, the path quality, and the throughput as well. 
Moreover, whenever the secondary users adjust their requirements the price function will be 
changed as well. By having such a function, selfish or malicious user in the network is 
prevented. If the secondary user uses the path for sending a specific number of packets and then 
the secondary user decides to increase the number of sent packets, the price function will 
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increase the price as a result of this action to prevent the secondary user from the selfish actions 
and give chance for other users to utilize the path. Thus pricing plays an important role in the 
interaction of primary users and secondary users. In cognitive radio networks, secondary users 
are price takers who behave strategically considering the price and the competition they face, and 
primary users are price makers who would like to maximize their own revenue. The pricing 
schemes can be classified as either static pricing or dynamic pricing.   
2.1.1.2 Static Price 
It is a set of fixed prices to allocate the network resource, such that the network revenue (or 
utility) can be maximized. It is also called one-shot pricing. The network parameters keep 
unchanged in the considered time. Figure 2.1 shows the categories of pricing schemes [13]. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Categories of pricing schemes [13] 
The most frequently used model in static pricing literature is Stackelberg game scheme [14, 
15], which is a two-stage leader-follower game. In the first stage, the service providers announce 
prices, and in the second stage, the users respond by choosing a service quantity. Both users and 
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the service provider are assumed selfish and rational. The task of users is to maximize their 
surpluses by choosing the right quantity of service, while the service provider tries to make a 
wise decision of prices to induce a desired resource allocation, such that its revenue can be 
maximized. 
2.1.1.3 Dynamic Price 
In contrast to static pricing schemes, dynamic pricing schemes are much more complicated, 
which consider the evolution of the pricing system in a sequence of time slots. The pricing 
strategies are adaptively changing according to the environment variations (e.g. network 
resource, user population and demands, network topology, channel conditions, etc) [13, 16, and 
17]. Despite the complexity, service providers prefer dynamic pricing schemes for the adaptation 
and flexibility of managing the network resource in the dynamic network environment, such that 
higher profits can be obtained. Though static pricing is still dominant in most of the networks 
today, dynamic pricing schemes are of both academic and practical significance, since it will be 
a promising solution for service providers that face the increasingly intensive competitions and 
the resource (e.g. bandwidth) shortage. 
2.1.1.4 Pricing in cognitive radio network  
The following works addressed the issue of pricing in a cognitive radio network. The auction 
mechanism was applied to the problem of spectrum sharing among users using spread spectrum 
signaling to access the channel [18-20]. However, the issue of equilibrium among multiple 
operators and the dynamics of spectrum bidding in a competitive environment were ignored. 
Competition among the cognitive radio entities in a spectrum sharing environment can be 
modeled as either non-cooperative game or cooperative game [21-24]. Specifically in cognitive 
radio network, the price technique was introduced in different fields such as the use of the power 
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resource by charging it to users [25], which is done by adding a cost component to the payoff 
function to add fairness to the network. The price also was introduced for resource allocation in 
[26] where utility/pricing strategy is defined that meets the objective to maximize the SUs 
capacity, and the protection for PUs by means of outage probability.  
In [27] the authors proposed solution for spectrum trading, by using pricing technique in a 
cognitive radio network where multiple primary users race with each other to offer spectrum 
access chances to the secondary users. However, in [27] pricing scheme is used where each of 
the primary user targets to maximize its payoff under its quality of service (QoS) constraints. 
Figure 2.2 shows the price scheme proposed in [27]. Consider a wireless system with multiple 
primary services (total number of primary services is denoted by N) operating on different 
frequency spectrum Fi and a secondary service which serves a group of secondary users willing 
to share these spectrum with the primary services. In the scheme, the price was used to control 
the quantity and to maximize the payoff of primary users. However, the primary service searches 
for the equilibrium by adjusting the price offered to the secondary service so that the profit is 
maximized. 
 
                               Figure 2.2: System Model for Spectrum Sharing [27] 
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 In [27], as shown in Figure 2.3, a spectrum based on cognitive radio wireless system with one 
primary user and N secondary users is also considered. The primary user is willing to share some 
portion of the spectrum with secondary user. However, the primary user controls secondary users 
for the spectrum by putting a price per bandwidth. By having the price function the primary user 
can control the total requested bandwidth for secondary user. 
 
                                  Figure 2.3: System Model for Spectrum Trading [27] 
In Figure 2.3, a dynamic game is offered in which a secondary user adapts its spectrum sharing 
strategy by noticing only the marginal profit which is a function of spectrum price offered by the 
primary user. In [28] the price was discussed in competitive cognitive radio network where the 
secondary users adjust their transmission power level to maximize their payoff. However, the 
primary users will be in charge of cost of the secondary users in order to enhance their own 
revenue. They model the behavior as a non-cooperative game model and then find the Nash 
equilibrium. Primary users (PUs) transmit the available spectrum to the base station over the 
bandwidth allocated, while the secondary users (SUs) request spectrum from the primary service 




Figure 2.4: System Model for Spectrum Trading [28] 
Figure 2.4 shows a number of cognitive secondary users. The base station charges the 
secondary user the amount per unit of transmit power on its uplink channel. For a secondary 
user, the payment can be seen as its cost of accessing the primary network. For the primary user, 
the payment can be seen as the compensation of its potential service quality degradation caused 
by the interference of secondary user. From previous discussions, the network pricing is a cross 
disciplinary research area and requires deep understanding of both networking technology and 
microeconomics. Basically, as it is shown in this section, pricing in cognitive network is based 
on many fields such as spectrum allocation, power control, and transmission control. In this 
thesis, the pricing technique is used for routing in cognitive radio network.    
2.1.2 Spectrum Trading and Spectrum Competition 
The spectrum can be traded between primary user and secondary users. The goal of this 
spectrum trading is to maximize the profit of primary users. Basically, the spectrum trading 
opens the competition’s door either among PUs or among SUs. The following works addressed 
18 
 
the problem of spectrum management, which consists of both spectrum trading and spectrum 
competition in cognitive radio network. In the cognitive radio network, spectrum trading is 
successfully formulated by economic models and competitive and cooperative pricing schemes 
are developed in [29]. In [30], hierarchical spectrum sharing is formulated as a unified market. 
Specifically, the pricing mechanism for the bandwidth allocations between the systems equates 
the supply to the demand. In [31], the consumers’ demand function is modeled and the Walrasian 
prices calculated which equate the demand to the supply of each goods.  
In [32], the authors addressed the problem of spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network 
where multiple primary and secondary strategic-users are involved. In addition primary users 
(PUs) would like to offer part of their spectrum to secondary users (SUs) to make extra revenue. 
Following process is applied in Figure 2.5: PU decides the amount of the bandwidth to lease, SU 
decides the amount of bandwidth to use, and AP collects all the strategies and makes 
proportional allocation.  
 




In [33], a model consisting of multiple primary service providers (PSPs) is proposed, which 
have some amount of unutilized bandwidth, and multiple secondary users (SUs) that require 
spectrum bands. Moreover, a new network element, called Telecommunication Coordinating 
Authority (TCA), is introduced in the proposed model. The TCA has the responsibility to control 
the satisfaction of all users in the PSPs’ networks by simultaneously limiting interference and 
maximizing cognitive capacity as shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
                                  Figure 2.6: System Information Flow [33] 
Figure 2.6 shows the flow is activated by the declaration of minimum desired bandwidth of 
SUs. The messages are broadcasted to PSPs periodically, in order to prevent multiple individual 
attempts. A game-theoretic modeling approach for a multiple-seller and multiple- buyer system 
has been proposed in [34] mainly by adopting the spectrum trading problem to the variations in 
price and quantity offered by the different primary users or primary service providers in order to 
maximize their utility functions. In addition, each user computes the bid that maximizes his 





                                     Figure 2.7: Spectrum Trading Model [34] 
 In [35], the authors proposed a dynamic spectrum allocation algorithm named market 
equilibrium and game (MEG). The market in their model consists of two submarkets: multiple 
primary service providers (PSPs) and a dynamic spectrum allocation server (DSAS) from the 
high submarket, while the low submarket is composed of the DSAS and a number of secondary 
users as in Figure 2.8.  
 
                                 Figure 2.8: Two Level Secondary Spectrum Market [35] 
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 The previous research mentioned in Sections 2.1 and this Section 2.2 apply different game 
frameworks to spectrum trading, spectrum competition, and some of them formulate price 
models as game theory framework. There are no approaches that consider the effect of applying 
game theory into the quality of service based routing. In addition, the previous works do not 
consider different levels of QoS. The previous research is summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Reference No. Spectrum Trading PUs’ Competition SUs’ Competition 
29 √ √  
30 √ √  
31 √  √ 
32 √ √  
33 √  √ 
34 √   
35 √ √  
 Table 2.1: Summary of Research Literature on Spectrum Management 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model that addresses the spectrum trading between 
PU and SU, the competition among PUs, and the competition among SUs together in one 
research work. This thesis proposes as part of spectrum management, the spectrum trading 
between PU and SU, the competition among PUs, and the competition among SUs. 
2.1.3 Routing in Cognitive Radio Network 
The most important issue in the network layer is routing. It is considered in Cognitive Radio 
Network as a challenging task due to the mobility of cognitive radio users (secondary users), the 
primary user’s presence, and the cognitivist functionality for each SU. In this section, an 
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overview of routing issues in cognitive radio network and literature review for the routing 
techniques in cognitive radio network is presented. 
2.1.3.1 Routing Issues in CRN 
The routing issues are the obstacles in the network which prevent the maximization of the 
utilization of resources. However, the routing issues change according to routing metrics, which 
are defined as values that are assigned to the links in a path and are used by routing algorithm to 
select the path between the source and destination. However, these weights usually reflect the 
cost of using that link in the path. The following are the routing issues: 
 Spectrum Knowledge: It is considered as the most important issue in CRN where the 
users in the CRN shall sense the spectrum. The secondary users must have local or global 
knowledge about the spectrum. 
 Overhead: It is the excess of the allowable number of transmissions that reduce the 
efficiency as well as the throughput of the whole network. Before the secondary user 
starts using the spectrum there is overhead for some bandwidth consumed for reporting 
sensing results from secondary users (SUs). 
 Link Failure: It is caused due to unexpected conditions. It requires extra power signal in 
order to recover the link. A link failure can occur in a CRN due to many reasons, such as 
a primary user becomes active or an intermediate secondary user moves to other place 
making no node available to replace the moved node. 
 Mobility Handling: In a CRN, a secondary user can move or join to other place at any 
time. Therefore, once a path is established and if some intermediate node moves to 
another location, it requires switching to other node and re-establishing a path.  
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 Best Path Selection: Nodes (users) look for the best path in terms of many parameters 
according to the QoS of the application, which may be either data or voice. In a CRN, the 
secondary user may have many different paths based on many factors such as the 
possibility of primary user to be active, the bandwidth capacity, the robustness and 
stability of path.  
The routing metrics that relate to these issues must be taken into consideration and are 
summarized in Table 2.2. 










Delay √ √ √ √ √ 
Link Capacity √ √    
Interference √  √ √ √ 
Power efficiency √ √ √  √ 
Throughput  √   √ 
Link robustness   √   
Link stability    √  
Cost     √ 
Table 2.2: Routing Metrics Related to Routing Issues 
The proposed algorithm in this thesis considers i) delay, ii) link capacity, iii) throughput, iv) 
link robustness and stability, and v) cost. 
2.1.3.2 Routing Techniques in CRN 
In most of the research papers, routing protocols are classified into spectrum aware-based (full 
spectrum knowledge or local spectrum knowledge [36]), multi-path based, and traditional 
routing (local coordination-based, reactive source-based and tree-based routing techniques [37]) 




















                      Figure 2.9: Routing Protocols for Cognitive Radio Network  
Each category in Figure 2.9 is described as follows. In spectrum aware routing, the nodes 
(users) select the route based on spectrum knowledge [36, 37]. In full spectrum knowledge, 
nodes should be aware of all other nodes. These nodes may be represented by a graph, or 
mathematical programming tools may be used to represent them. On the other hand, in the 
routing schemes that are based on local spectrum knowledge the information about spectrum 
availability is locally constructed at each secondary user through a distributed protocol.  
In multi path routing, the multi-paths are discovered first and then the node selects one route 
(path) among multiple routes (paths) according to different metrics selected such as delay, 
throughput, and link availability. The multi-path routing algorithm makes the network more 
dynamic while increasing the efficiency. The multi-path routing for CRN was addressed in [38], 
which uses dynamic source routing mechanism for route discovery. Moreover, [38] is based on 
broadcasting an RREQ message with the user’s ID, next hop, and hop count. Each intermediate 
node updates the fields in the RREQ message and the destination responds with a RREP message 
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on the path that satisfies the metrics chosen. Through multi-path routing [38] one achieves higher 
throughput as well as better resiliency.  
In reactive source based routing within traditional routing category, the source specifies the 
path of data. Hence, the path to destination is computed by the source. The reactive source for 
CRN was addressed in [39], where the route is selected in order to achieve the bandwidth 
demand based on the probabilistic definition. In tree based routing a centralized routing scheme 
is considered, which is controlled by a single network entity. The tree based routing was 
addressed in [40]. It uses two schemes: the first scheme is based on end to end throughput metric 
and the other is based on the least load. It requires the nodes to register with the centralized 
entity. The local coordination based routing begins when nodes estimate the load of the flow. 
However, nodes choose the flow based on neighborhood interface, and is addressed in [41]. The 
above routing protocols with their related issues are summarized in Table 2.3.  
 Spectrum 
Aware 
Multi-Path Traditional Routing 
 Reactive 
Source 




√ √ √   
Mobility 
Handling 
√  √  √ 
Overhead √ √  √  
Best Path 
selection 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Link failure  √ √  √ 
Solutions [36, 37] [38] [39] [40] [41] 
Table 2.3: Summary of Routing Protocols 
2.2 State of the Art 
2.2.1 Routing Models in CRN 
Routing is a vital yet not intensely studied area of research in CRNs [1]. There is only a limited 
work for the QoS routing in CRN. In [42], DORP, a routing and spectrum assignment scheduling 
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algorithm is proposed to achieve lower switching and back off delay. However, the algorithm is 
under the assumption that the node has two transceivers, one is traditional and the other is a 
cognitive radio, which means that each node has data to transmit and must know the frequency 
band choice of every node along the route to destination. This is costly in terms of energy 
consumption and it requires having global information. In [43], a routing and spectrum selection 
for cognitive radio networks that computes paths from a source to a destination by considering 
the activity of primary users is proposed. The work in [43] does not cover the issues of channel 
assignment and delay control. In [44], RACON, a novel algorithm based on the capturing of any 
spatial locality of link disconnection for multi-hop in CRN is proposed, but the problem in [44] 
is the assignment of ID to the nodes, as well as the selection of efficient strategies. For the 
following works, they do not consider the route stability. In [45] the authors propose a routing 
metric that accounts for the available channels and hop count. In [46-48], the switching delay is 
considered. The unpredictable behavior of primary users is considered in [49]. Recently, a 
cooperative green routing model with an energy-efficient consideration algorithm is proposed in 
order to reduce the power consumption [50]. More recently, a routing algorithm for route 
robustness and spectrum allocation is proposed [51-53]. As a result, the issues in the previous 
works are considered in our model.   
2.2.2 Game Theory in CRN 
Recently, game theory has been used in the communication area [4-8]. Basically, it has been 
used to model and analyze resource allocation problems in competitive area and it has also been 
used for security issues.  The cognitive radio network becomes the focal part in the wireless 
network and game theory has also been applied to cognitive radio networks [8-12]. Table 2.4 
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shows the correspondence between each element in a cognitive radio network with each element 
in game theory. 
 
Elements of a game Element of a CRN 
Players Nodes (Secondary and Primary users) 
Actions Change parameters 
Payoff Throughput, Delay, Bandwidth, Interference, etc. 
Table 2.4: Cognitive Radio Network based on Wireless Networking Game 
2.2.2.1 Game Theory for spectrum trading and competition in CRN 
Game theory is a useful tool that can be used for spectrum management in cognitive radio 
network [54]. In [55], they modeled the competitive dynamic spectrum leasing by using the 
concept of game theory. Specifically, one level is between primary user and spectrum broker and 
the other level is between secondary user and service provider. The players of this game are the 
secondary users and their strategies are defined in terms of selection of a particular service 
provider. In [25], a game-theoretic cooperative spectrum sensing was proposed for cognitive 
radio network. In particular, they studied the interactive decision of selfish secondary users on 
cooperative spectrum sensing. The players of this game are the secondary users and their 
strategies are defined in terms of selecting frequency of channel. In [56], a non-cooperative game 
is formulated for spectrum trading in cognitive radio network. In this game, the players are the 
secondary users, and their strategies are for buying spectrum from the primary user. In [57], a 
game theoretic price competition was proposed in cognitive radio network. Specifically, they 
analyzed price competition in CRNs jointly considering both bandwidth and spatial reuse. The 
competitive spectrum leasing in a primary market was analyzed using auction methods in [58]. 
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2.2.2.2 Game Theory for other issues in CRN 
Due to the nature of cognitive radio network any change in environment will trigger the 
network to re-allocate the spectrum resources; the game theory was used as an important tool to 
analyze, model, and study the interactions. In cognitive radio network, some of the game 
theoretic models were presented in [59], which has identified potential game models for power 
control, call admission control, and interference avoidance in cognitive radio networks. Several 
methods have been proposed for dynamic spectrum access using game theory [60]. In [60], the 
channel allocation problem is modeled as a repeated game. In this, the players are secondary 
users and their strategies (actions) are choosing a channel. In [60] two classes of payoff were 
presented according to which cognitive radios adapt their transmissions. The first class 
corresponds to selfish behavior. The second class corresponds to cooperative behavior. The 
benefit of a game theory model in CRN is summarized as follows: the network users’ behavior 
and actions can be analyzed; game theory provides us the equilibrium (solution), and the non-
cooperative game theory gives us the ability to derive efficient distributed approaches. Basically, 
as shown in Table 2.5, the solution for most game models is Nash equilibrium, which means that 
each player has no chance to increase its utility by unilaterally deviating from this equilibrium.  
Issue in CRN Game Model Solution Reference 
Power Control Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium [59] 
Interference 
Potential game, Stackelberg 
game 
Nash equilibrium [61] 
Spectrum Sharing Cooperative Nash equilibrium [62] 
Power Allocation Potential game Nash equilibrium [63] 
Spectrum access Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium [64] 
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Security Stackelberg Nash equilibrium [65] 
Spectrum Trading Supply and Demand 
functions 
Market equilibrium [66] 
Table 2.5: Summary of Game Models for Issues in CRN 
Table 2.5 shows the different issues in CRN that have been modeled by game theory.  This 
modeling gives us the ability to understand the issue deeply and based on that the parameters of 
models are changed according to our requirements.  Most game theoretic models were modeled 
for issues related to power and spectrum such as spectrum allocation, spectrum sharing, spectrum 
access, spectrum trading, power allocation, power control, and interference avoidance. The game 
theory models that are presented in previous two sub-sections could be one of the following 
kinds of game theory:  
 Non-cooperative game: The users act to maximize their own payoff individually. 
 Cooperative game:  The users have mutual actions to gain shared benefits. 
 Static game: It is deterministic, time independent, and is good for one period. 
 Dynamic game: It is good for more periods and any change in the parameters of the 
system will affect the game. 
 Repeated game: A group of agents engage in a strategic interaction over and over. 
 Stackelberg game: It consists of a leader and a follower. Leader announces a policy and 
the follower chooses its policy based on leader’s action. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no approach that uses the game theory concepts in 
routing. In this thesis, the game theory concept is applied to the routing algorithm to observe the 
network performance.  
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2.2.3 Literature review of QoS in Cognitive Radio Network 
Even though cognitive radio has attracted increasing attention in recent years, research on 
cognitive radio network is still immature. QoS performance is one of the most sought research 
points for cognitive radio network. In [69], a QoS Routing approach called K-shortest widest 
paths Q-Routing algorithm is proposed by Alireza Esfahani et al. to improve end to end delay 
factor; however, the shortest widest path is sometimes not efficient. In [70] the authors proposed 
a power control strategy: fix the bit error rate and control the power to guarantee the optimal 
QoS, but the network performance was not studied. In [71], secondary users can achieve the 
available spectrum rapidly and reduce the time for spectrum switching which will improve 
capacity utilization and throughput, although it is costly. In [72], three QoS metrics are proposed 
which are used to evaluate the performance of the network: blocking probability, dropping 
probability, and failure probability but the PUs’ presence was not addressed. In [73], He Qing et 
al. presented a routing algorithm based on QoS requirement for cognitive radio network which 
takes into account the effect of the bandwidth and delay; the efficiency of the network in terms 
of throughput was not addressed. In [74], the authors proposed an approach for impact on routing 
selection which was caused by channel capacity and interference arising from intra-flow 
contention. However [74] does not consider the mobility of network nodes. A strategy for QoS 
performance based on fuzzy logic control was studied by Al-Fuqaha et al. in [75]. The problem 
in [75] is that it is costly as well as it is more complex. This work proposes models that avoid the 
shortcomings in the previous works [69-75]. 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the concepts of the pricing techniques, the spectrum trading, the spectrum 
competition, the routing issue, and the game theory are reviewed for CRNs. It is concluded that 
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the price is a very important control factor that can control the behaviors of nodes in the network. 
The spectrum trading and spectrum competition are still open for research due to the variety of 
CRN architectures. The routing issue plays a vital role in the network performance in terms of 
the throughput. The game theory concept is also a very important concept to give the model the 
flexibility and to find the solution dynamically. As mentioned in this chapter, the existing 
research groups deal with issues as follows: some groups deal with price and spectrums trading 
as one issue regardless of other issues, the other groups deal with routing issue, and some other 
groups apply the game theory concept to the spectrum trading and competition model. Hence, in 
this thesis, a game theory approach for routing in cognitive radio network based on spectrum 
management is proposed. In the next chapter, the system requirements of our model are 
reviewed. These requirements consist of SUs’ requirements, spectrum sensing, spectrum 














Chapter 3: System Requirements 
 
A multiple primary users and multiple secondary users exist in the system considered where a 
primary user buys spectrum from base station. The PU can lease a part of this spectrum to 
secondary users.  
3.1 System Assumptions 
In this paper, we consider an overlay model. In addition, users can exchange their profile 
information through a common control channel, as in [15], or in a distributed manner, as in [16]. 
Each PU has k channels assigned from the base station with a specific cost called Base Station 
Cost, which is described in the next section. In our model, the network consists of N primary 
users and M secondary users. Moreover, we define Sj as the spectrum size for renting, which is 
offered by PUj. A unique ID is defined for each channel. In terms of security, we assume that all 
the nodes (PU & SU) in the network are trusted nodes.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the general system 
of the proposed models. 








                     Figure 3.1: Multiple Primary Users Cognitive Radio Network 
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Basically, the only function of the base station is to allocate the spectrum to PUs at the 
beginning. The main components in our system are therefore the primary users and the 
secondary users. In this chapter, the secondary user’s flow is defined. The mechanism of 
spectrum sensing as well as the spectrum allocation is reviewed. In addition, the spectrum market 
overview is presented and the primary user’s requirements are presented as well. Finally, the 
QoS levels function are described and defined whereas this function consists of three levels. 
3.2 Secondary User’s Flow 
The network consists of: spectrum owners (PUs) and consumers (SUs). Primary users have 
fixed mobility whereas secondary users are moving and changing their places arbitrarily. Each 
flow requires the capacity of one channel on each hop along the path between the source and the 
destination nodes for the duration of its service in order to fulfill its requirements. Once the flow 
gets accepted, a flow must have continuous service for the duration of its service time. After the 
service time has elapsed, the flow is deemed to have been completed successfully. However, in 
traditional wireless network the flow might be blocked. With cognitive radio functionality 
enabled, it can search for another way to service the flow instead of getting blocked. The 
network consists of N PUs and M SUs as shown in Figure 3.1. A PU is defined as a spectrum 
owner that may trade a spectrum to other users. Each PU has k channels assigned to it in advance 
and it offers an adaptable number of these channels to SUs. For each PUi, Si is the spectrum size 
for renting with its QoS requirements, and the price of spectrum. These parameters are changed 
over time corresponding to the network conditions, such as traffic load, spectrum demand, and 
spectrum cost. Basically, a dynamic spectrum allocation is considered where the PU can change 
the price and the size of the offered spectrum when needed due to the changes in network and the 
user’s behavior. Game theory is used to help PUs to set the route parameters, spectrum size and 
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price for all SUs based on their requirement. SUs can access a licensed spectrum if they rent the 
spectrum from a PU. From PUs point of view, the optimal resource management scheme is the 
one which maximizes their revenue. However, some constraints prevent PUs from maximizing 
its profit such as resource constraint and QoS for PUs. 
 In this work, the problem, how to manage the routing selection trading in the secondary 
spectrum market for satisfying both QoS levels of services for SUs and PUs as well maximizing 
the revenue of PUs, is addressed. PUs provide different QoS levels to SUs to maximize their 
profits while considering the trading constraint. Hence, the price of route access changes 
according to user requirement, and providing a service to new SUs whenever there is available 
spectrum may not maximize the PU’s revenue. The PU has the choice of whether to accept the 
request or reject it and wait till a user with worthy reward requests. Therefore, the optimal 
resource management scheme is mandatory in our system. Basically, the problem of optimal 
resource allocation for satisfying multiple levels of QoS for multiple SUs is a challenging one in 
the design of our network. The main motivation in doing this is to adapt the services to the 
changes in the structure of the spectrum secondary market. Most of the research that has been 
conducted in this field assumes one type of service. Nowadays, with an explosion in the diversity 
of real-time services a better and more reliable communication is required. Moreover, some of 
these applications require firm performance guarantees from the PUs. After the source node 
selects the route, the payoff for the source can be calculated from the throughput experienced by 
the route. The path will consist of multiple nodes with each node experiencing different payoffs. 
The payoff of the intermediate node includes the cost incurred while forwarding the traffic from 
the source node. This cost can be the cost of battery power usage, the level of QoS, the usage 
period, and many other factors.  
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3.3 Spectrum Sensing 
One of the most important findings from the measurements reported in [67] is that a large 
portion of the radio spectrum is not in use for significant periods of time in certain areas. Thus, 
there are a lot of spectrum holes, which are defined as a set of frequency bands assigned 
(licensed) to a user (primary user) but not utilized. However, the key idea of spectrum utilization 
can be drastically increased by allowing secondary users to access the spectrum holes that are 
unutilized by the primary user at certain time and space. Cognitive radio has been proposed as a 
means achieving such dynamics. A cognitive radio senses the spectral environment over a wide 
frequency band and exploits this information to opportunistically provide wireless links that can 






















Sensing Low x High 
  
x 
Table 3.1: Spectrum Identification Method 
The cognitive-radio devices have two important functionalities: spectrum sensing and 
adaptation. Initially, before using the channel, SUs have to detect the activities of the primary 
users. Among different channel detection techniques, sensing-based access to the channel is 
favored because of its low employment cost and compatibility with the legacy of licensed 
systems [62]. As shown in Table 3.1, the first two approaches charge the primary systems with 
the task of providing secondary users with current spectrum usage information by either 
registering the relevant data (e.g., the primary system’s location and power as well as expected 
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duration of usage) at a centralized database or broadcasting this information on regional beacons 
[68].  
A typical duty cycle of CR, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, includes detecting spectrum white 
space, selecting the best frequency bands, coordinating spectrum access with other users and 
vacating the frequency when a primary user appears. Such a cognitive cycle is supported by the 
following functions [82]: 
 Spectrum sensing and analysis. 
 Spectrum management and handoff. 






Figure 3.2: Spectrum Sensing Algorithm [82] 
In our model, spectrum sensing solely relies on the secondary system to identify spectrum 
through direct sensing of the licensed bands. In this case the secondary system monitors a 
licensed frequency band and opportunistically transmits when it does not detect any primary 
signal. CR is defined as a radio that can autonomously change its transmission parameters based 
on interaction with the complex environment (radio scene, application and user requirements) in 
which it operates. 
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3.4 Spectrum Allocation 
In most countries, the spectrum is allocated to PUs using auction theory. PUs compete to get 
the license for a spectrum. The competitive behavior among PUs was initiated by spectrum 
auctions held in 2000 and 2001. Auction theory achieved significant success for spectrum in 
some countries; however, it did not succeed in others [68]. In our work, game theory will be used 
to model the competition among PUs for the spectrum, among SUs to model the spectrum 
selection strategies, and between PU and SU. 












                                 Figure 3.3: The Coupling between PUs and SUs 
Traditional spectrum allocations schemes are usually long–term and PUs have exclusive right 
to access spectrum. Static allocation schemes of spectrum fail to utilize the unused spectrum 





SUs. In order to utilize unused spectrum efficiently, a new concept of Dynamic Spectrum 
Allocation (DSA) is proposed. In DSA, spectrum will be allocated dynamically depending on 
need of the PUs and PUs can trade the unused spectrum. SUs are usually associated with one PU, 
i.e., get their services from one PU for a period of time. Hence, there is a strong coupling 
between the SU and PU as shown in Figure 3.3 that does not allow much flexibility to the SUs. 
Figure 3.3 shows the black holes and gray holes for the spectrum where the black holes are used 
and the gray holes are unused. However, in our work SUs can select the PU that provides the 
best quality of service (QoS) and offers the lowest price. SUs take into account several factors 
when connecting to a PU. These factors include users’ preferences – quality of service (QoS), 
quality of experience (QoE), coverage, price etc. In our modeled spectrum market, SUs will be 
the customers of one of the PUs that provide the SUs authentication credentials, billing account 
and access to a spectrum. In our spectrum market there is no strong association between SUs and 
PU as a SU can choose any provider almost on a session by session basis. In addition to trade 
free spectrum, PUs use a multitude of access technologies, operating on both licensed and 
unlicensed bands, to serve an increasing number of customers. In the spectrum market, PUs have 
to support various services that have varied QoS requirements, for example, video and telephony 
services are more sensitive to delay than services such as file downloads that are affected by loss. 
With such loose coupling between PUs and SUs, several questions arise: 
 How or which PU should be selected by a SU?  
 What price per unit of resource should be offered by PUs such that profit is maximized? 
By introducing all the PUs and SUs in a market environment, it becomes convenient to 
leverage the concept of prices of services to regulate the demands of SUs who consume 
resources (spectrum). With dynamic spectrum access in effect for PUs, loose coupling exists 
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between PUs and SUs since a SU can be associated with any one of the PU. It is clear that a new 
economic model needs to be developed. A vast number of options are available for dynamic 
spectrum allocation. 
In our spectrum market, PUs manage the allocation, usage, and pricing of the portions of the 
spectrum which is unused, or under-utilized. In such a dynamic setting, the question arises, how 
the spectrum will be allocated from the PU to the SUs and how PUs will determine the price of 
their services to the SUs? Each PU has to manage the free spectrum and trade the free spectrum 
and it knows how to obtain the spectrum back when needed. Free spectrum is used to offer 
services to SUs and generate revenue according to some business strategies.  
3.5 Primary User’s Requirements: 
In this section, we present an overview of spectrum market and we define the primary user’s 
constraints. 
3.5.1 Spectrum Market Overview: 
A PU can sell portions of the free spectrum to the unlicensed users (secondary users, SUs) who 
are willing to access the spectrum. SUs pay a PU for spectrum usage. To trade free spectrum, a 
PU disseminates the trading information to SUs. This information includes: 
 The available spectrum. 
 The metrics for route. 
 The price to be paid to access the spectrum as well as access the route. 
After receiving spectrum information and the proposed routes based on secondary user 
requirements, each SU decides whether to accept the deal or not. PUs allocate spectrum as well 
as set the path for its customer after receiving SU’s approval.  
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3.5.2 Primary User’s constraints: 
In the spectrum market, the spectrum owners and the spectrum leasers correspond to the PUs 
and the SUs, respectively. In this market PUi rents free spectrum of size si ϵ Si from its spectrum. 
PUi has total available bandwidth of size Si and charges price pi (per user per unit time) to the 
SUs. In our model, the pricing for routing is considered. However, the secondary users send the 
primary user their requirements and based on that the primary user sets the price for the route. 
The secondary user has a choice to either accept or not as in Figure 3.4. With this market 
structure, SUs are free to choose and buy the spectrum that provides the best payoff in terms of 





     
Figure 3.4: Handshaking between a Primary User and a Secondary User. 
There are two levels of competition in the spectrum trading market. The competition in the 
first level is among PUs to sell the unused spectrum to the SUs. If the offered price by PUi is 
high, SUs will deviate to buy spectrum opportunities from other PUs. Therefore, each of the PUs 
must carefully set spectrum prices based on the following: 
 Competition with other PUs. 
 Spectrum demand. 
 PUs requirements. 
Each PU must carefully set the price of the offered spectrum so that the payoff of the PU is 
maximized and the PUs’ requirements are met. SUs compete to select the best offered spectrum 
PU 
SU 
Secondary user requirements 
Primary user sets the price based on SU requirements 
Secondary user has the choice to either accept or reject 
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in terms of spectrum price and quality. For example, if all SUs buy the spectrum from the same 
PU (i.e. the PU who offers the lowest price), the corresponding spectrum will get congested and 
the quality of the spectrum will be degraded significantly. 
 In this case, the PU will increase the price to get more profit because of spectrum demand. As 
a result, SUs will start looking for other PUs and they will compete to get the spectrum with 
lower prices and better performance. SUs stop looking for other PUs when the payoff becomes 







                                                                                                                
 
 
                        Figure 3.5: Handshaking between multiple PUs with one SU  
It is shown in Figure 3.5 that the secondary user sends his requirements to all active primary 
users and then the primary user will respond by sending the offered price. The secondary user 
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Offered Price 





3.6 QoS for PUs and SUs 
In this section, a literature review about QoS in cognitive radio network is presented, the 
metrics for QoS for SUs and PUs at each path are defined, define mathematical models to 
evaluate these metrics, propose adaptation algorithms to support QoS for both SUs and PUs, and 
define new strategies for PUs and SUs to negotiate based on their QoS. 
3.6.1 QoS Levels for secondary users in our model 
In this work, the QoS is classified to three different levels. A novel function is introduced to 
control the level of QoS and price. The QoS function f (LQoS) is defined as follows: 
                                  f (LQoS) = QoSlevel * ln(b).                                                                         (3.1) 
where QoSlevel may take a value of 1, 2 or 3, depending upon the QoS level requested, and b is 
the size of spectrum traded to the secondary user. The first level is the lowest level of QoS 
service, the second level is the middle level of QoS service, and the third level is the highest 
level of QoS service. 
 The First Level contains the following metrics:  
 Delay 
 Transmission Rate 
 The Second Level contains the following: 
 Level 1 metrics 
 Link robustness 
 The Third Level contains the following: 
 Level 2 metrics 
 Expected Transmission Count (EXT) 
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3.6.2 QoS metrics in our model 
In this section, the metrics in each level are described and how the metrics affect the 
performance of Cognitive Radio Network. 
3.6.2.1 Delay and Transmission Rate 
Delay is an important QoS parameter in any wireless network. It is well known that 
CRN users are expected to experience, by default, widely varied delays due to 
uncertainty of channel availability. Compared to existing wireless networks, delay 
analysis attains a complex scenario in CRN due to the presence of PUs. Delay 
constraint needs to be considered in determining the number of secondary users 
supported or number of channels to be sensed or number of radio interfaces required by 
a single secondary user. In [76, 77] the authors developed scheduling models for 
secondary network to analyze the performance of packet delivery time. Scheduling 
model in [77] considers different priority among SUs where they are forced to stay in 
the same channel. 
To the best of our knowledge, delay in CRNs is the combination of two components: the 
information propagation delay and the queuing delay: The information propagation delay is the 
total amount of time that a packet spends in traveling over the intermittent relaying links in a 
CRN and is determined by the underlying communication capabilities of the network. The 
queuing delay is the amount of time that a packet spends in waiting for other packets to finish 
their transmission and is determined by traffic load and scheduling algorithms in CRNs. In our 
model, one more constraint is added to control the delay, the probability of channel availability, 
Probk: 
                              Probk   = nId * tId / (tbusy + nId * tId)                                                             (3.2) 
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where nId is the total number of idle period, tId is the time of each idle period, and tbusy is the busy 
time of channel. Transmission rate is more related to the bandwidth of channel as well as the 
packet size. There is no constraint considered in this thesis to control the transmission rate 
because this metric will vary based on the offered bandwidth from the intermediate nodes (either 
SU or PU).                    
3.6.2.2        Link robustness 
The “Link Robustness” metric is offered in this work for level 2 QoS. This metric is very 
important for maximizing the throughput and to guarantee the stability of service. Once the 
robustness is selected, the spectrum to be allocated on each link along the selected route is 
determined. In cognitive radio network, this metric means the presence of PU. In this work, the 
probability of PU presence is calculated as follows: 
                                ProbPU = Plink * Probk                                                                   (3.3) 
In equation 3.3, the previous constraint Probk is added to guarantee level 1 of QoS within the 
level 2 QoS and Plink is the measurements of the loss probability.  
3.6.2.3 Expected Transmission Count (EXT) 
This metric is required for level 3 QoS, which is considered as the highest level and a higher 
price among other levels as well. The primary goal of the ETX design is to find paths with high 
throughput, in spite of losses. The derivation of ETX starts with the measurements of the loss 
probability, denoted by Plink, to calculate the expected number of transmissions. The cognitive 
radio network requires that for a transmission to be successful, the packet must be successfully 
delivered to each intermediate node until the destination node. ETX is calculated as follows [83]: 
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                    ETX (link) = 1 / (Plink)                                                                                    (3.4) 
                    ETX (Path) = ∑ (ETX (link))                                                                             (3.5) 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, three important parts were discussed; the first part is the secondary user 
requirements, the second part is the primary user requirements, and the third part is different QoS 
levels. The secondary user’s flow was defined. The mechanism of spectrum sensing as well as 
the spectrum allocation was reviewed. In addition, the spectrum market overview was presented 
and the primary user’s requirements were presented as well. Finally, the QoS levels function 
were described and defined where this function consists of three levels. Next Chapter describes 











Chapter 4: QoS based Routing Algorithm for CRN  
 
In this chapter, the system model that consists of base station cost, intermediate node cost, 
price function, and profit function is introduced. The stages of our model are presented and the 
QoS based route algorithm is introduced with an example. Finally, all proposed equations are 
simulated. Two different approaches to describe the system modeled are presented. First, the 
model is described without game theory. Some of the steps of this model apply also to the model 
using concept of game theory, which is described next. 
4.1 System Model without Game Theory 
In this section, the equations of our model without using the concept of game theory are 
described. 









                                         Figure 4.1: System Model between PU and Base Station 
The stages of our model without concepts of game theory are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
wherein the preliminary stage (Figure 4.1) is between the primary user and its base station, and 
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the main stages (Figure 4.2) are between the primary user and the secondary user. The steps 
between a PUi and its base station as shown in Figure 4.1 are: 1) PUi requests base station for 
channel ki that has spectrum Si with bandwidth BWi, 2) base station calculates the base station 
cost CBS and sends it to the primary user, 3) PUi may or may not accept the deal and sends its 
response to the base station, 4) base station based on PU’s decision in the previous step will 
either allocate the spectrum or release the request. 






Primary User 1 Primary User 2
1 212
4 545
   
                                 Figure 4.2: System Model between PU and SU 
Figure 4.2 shows the following steps: 1) a secondary user requests primary users for channel or 
portion of channel with the requested spectrum size, the bandwidth size, as well as the level of 
QoS, 2) primary user checks the availability of spectrum for the QoS level requested, calculates 
the price considering other PUs as sellers, and sends it to the secondary user, 3) and 4) secondary 
user checks other offers received and chooses the best with least price offered and better QoS, 5) 
primary user responds to the secondary user’s decision of accepting the primary user by 
allocating the spectrum; otherwise, the request is dropped. In the next subsection, spectrum 
trading is introduced.  
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4.1.1 Spectrum Trading between PUs and SUs 
In spectrum trading, the main concern of PUs is to maximize their own revenue while 
supporting the QoS for SUs. PUs trade the extra (unused) spectrum to the SUs to maximize their 
revenue. For spectrum trading, one of the challenging issues is pricing. In our model, the design 
of the price function answers the following: how to set the spectrum price in a competitive 
environment where multiple sellers offer spectrum to the buyer, so that the sellers (e.g., primary 
users) are satisfied and their profits are maximized. The spectrum pricing in cognitive radio 
network is discussed in this thesis in Section 2.1. Moreover, the price in our model consists of: 
 The initial stage occurs when the secondary user sends its requirements as well as the 
required level of QoS to the available PUs.  
 In the second stage, after the PU calculates its price, it calculates α as in equation 4.8 
and 4.9 to obtain the total price, which is then sent to the SU. This factor could be 
helpful in attracting more demands from SU. 
The proposed price function is very dynamic and efficient because all the agents that could 
affect the service (e.g. path and spectrum) are considered. In the next subsection, the revenue 
functions are introduced. 
4.1.2 Revenue Functions 
The problem of competitive pricing in a cognitive radio network is addressed where the 
primary users offer spectrum access opportunities to a secondary user. This problem is 
formulated as an oligopoly market where few ﬁrms (PUs) compete with each other in terms of 
price in order to get the highest proﬁt. For the primary user, the cost of renting the spectrum to 
secondary users is defined as a function of the quality of service (QoS), data transmission rate, 
and the spectrum size. This function is called PPU, as shown in equations 4.5. For the 
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intermediate secondary user, a spectrum cost function is established based on the spectrum size, 
which depends on the channel quality (QoS level). This cost is called intermediate cost CSU as in 
equation 4.4. In addition we assume that PUs can get the channels from base station for a certain 
cost called CBS, as in equation 4.1. The equations are introduced as follows: 
Each PU would first pay a cost to base station to provide a channel for the SU. This cost will 
be a part of the price. The base station cost is calculated as follows: 
                                     CBS = log (BWk) * k * t * PBS.                                                    (4.1) 
where BWk is the bandwidth of k channels provided by base station (BS) to the primary user, t is 
the time of using the k channels, and PBS is the unit price specified by base station based on PU 
request. The price of each channel is defined by PU such that the profit of that channel is 
maximized. Hence, the profit earned by renting channels is as follows: 
                                     Profit = k * Ptotal – CBS – CSU                                                            (4.2) 
where k is the number of channels assigned to a SU, Ptotal is the offered channel price for SU as 
in equations 4.6a and 4.6b, CBS is the base station cost as in equation (4.1), and CSU is the cost 
paid to the intermediate nodes, defined in equation 4.4. A novel function to control the level of 
QoS and price is introduced. This novel function called the QoS function f (LQoS) is defined as 
follows:      
                                      f (LQoS) = QoSlevel * ln (b).                                                                (4.3)     
where QoSlevel may take a value of 1, 2 or 3, depending upon the QoS level requested, and b is 
the total size of spectrum traded to the secondary user. 
The CSU is the cost, which is paid by the PU to rent spectrum from an intermediate node, and is 
defined as follows: 
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                                      CSU = f (LQoS) * bSU * PSU.                                                                (4.4)  
where f (LQoS) is the QoS function for the path selected, bSU represents the size of the spectrum 
rented from intermediate nodes and PSU is the unit spectrum price for intermediate nodes. The 
price function PPU calculated by PU to increase its revenue is defined as follows: 
                                   PPU = W* ln (b) + *P * b + *f (LQoS)                                                  (4.5) 
where W is the data transmission rate, b is the size of spectrum traded to the secondary user,  is 
the number of customers (SUs that request one channel or more), P is the unit price for the 
spectrum traded, and f (LQoS) is the function of QoS. The total and competitive price follows the 
next equations: 
                                    Ptotal = PPU  ; α = 1                                                                                        (4.6a)      
when there is no competitive primary. If there is no available channel (α = 0) Ptotal = ∞. The 
equation 4.6b is the normal case where there are some competitive primary users, some available 
channels, and a usage period. 
                                                 Ptotal = PPU + A             ; 0.1 < α < 0.99                                          (4.6b)   
A is a constant that signifies the effect of a number of PUs and SUs on offered price. If the 
number of competitive PUs is higher than the number of SUs requesting spectrum, the offered 
price should be lowered.  It is calculated as follows: 
                            A = 
where is the number of competitive PUs and  is the number of customers (SUs that request 
one channel or more). In the following sub-section, the spectrum competition is described.  
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4.1.3 Spectrum Competition among PUs 
In this model, there are multiple primary users that offer a spectrum to multiple secondary 
users based on their price. A PU competes with other PUs by offering a suitable price to the 
secondary users. A new coefficient α (0 < α < 1), called competition factor is defined. A PU 
selects the value of this coefficient by considering the number of PUs offering that channel, the 
usage period of the offered channel, and the probability of its presence. The competition factor 
function is described in the following function (equations 4.8a, 4.8b, and 4.8c). 
                                   α = 1,                   when the number of primary user = 1                   (4.8a) 
                                   0.1 < α < 0.99,     the normal case                                                      (4.8b) 
                                   α = 0,                   when there is no available channel                       (4.8c) 
If no other PU offers the requested channel, α = 1, which means the price remains same and is 
not adjusted. If there is no available channel, α = 0, which means the price offered is 0. However, 
if there are a number of primary users with available channel for the request as well as the usage 
period of the offered channel, the PU chooses an appropriate value for α (0.1 < α < 0.99) to 
reduce the total price as per the following equation. 
                                   
where is the number of PUs offering the path, is the number of channels, is the number of 
SUs requesting a specific channel, and is the usage time of the channel. In Figure 4.3, the 
equation 4.9 is simulated to see the effect of competition factor. Figure 4.3 shows the 
effectiveness of  value due to the total price (offered); and3 is used where 
So when is increased the total (offered) price will be increased. In addition, 
when the numbers of primary users becomes larger, the total price offered remains the same even 
if is changed. The reason of not changing the total price when the numbers of primary users is 
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large is that, as a market nature, the primary user cannot let the offered price decrease until it 
reaches zero. The cognitive nodes are randomly placed in 300x300 m
2
 and the transmission 
range is 150 meters. The usage time considered is three hours. However, the number of cognitive 
nodes in CRN is changeable. The length of packet size is 64Kbit. The values considered for 
and3 are for example sake only.  
 
Figure 4.3: The Effectiveness of Competition Factor against Profit 
Moreover, the parameters that the alpha value depends on are changed. The parameters are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
Legend id No. of SUs No. of channels Usage period in hour 
X1 4 2 2 
X2 14 4 5 
X3 24 6 10 
Table 4.1: Parameters used to simulate alpha equation in Figure 4.4 






















The parameters in Table 4.1 are used to simulate the alpha equation. Figure 4.4 shows how the 
alpha changes according to the parameters in Table 4.1. X1, X2, and X3 are used as legends to 
represent the different values of parameters. The alpha values in X1 is always greater than in X2 
and X3 because the values of parameters in X1 such as the number of SUs, the number of 
channels, and the usage period are less than the corresponding values in X2 or X3. The PU 
therefore has the liberty to choose the value of alpha to be higher. However, the values of α for 
X2 and X3 are not too different because when the values of parameters become high, the alpha 
value will not be that much affected. 
 
Figure 4.4: The Competition Factor based on Three Different Network Scenarios 
4.2 System Model Stages 
In this section, the various stages of our models are described. There are four stages; the 
preliminary stage, the first stage, the second stage, and the third stage. This section also describes 
the algorithm for our models, which is used to find a path for SU based on its requirements. In 



























addition, this algorithm is used to calculate the price for the spectrum offered and the profit for 
PU is calculated as well. 
4.2.1 Preliminary stage: 
In the preliminary stage as in Figure 4.5, each SU shares its profile vector with its sensed PUs, 
which then exchanges their profiles among each other. Two kinds of profile are defined, the SU 
profile and the PU profile; each profile contains multiple records. 
 Secondary User Profile:  ProfileSUi = {Profileid, SUid, kid, PUid, neighborcount, 
[neighborid], Probk, ProbPU, Plink, BW}, where Profileid is the ID for SU s’ profile, SUid 
is the secondary user id, [neighborid] is a vector that contains the list of SU’s neighbor 
ID, kid is id of channel, PUid is the id of primary user that offers the channel kid, 
neighborcount is the number of neighbors, and Probk is probability of idle slots to busy 
slots as defined in the Chapter 3(equation (3.4)). ProbPU is the probability of PU 
presence, BW is the bandwidth of the channel (spectrum), and Plink is the probability 
for link robustness as defined in the Chapter 3(equation (3.5)). 
 Primary User Profile: ProfilePUj = {Profileid, ProfileSUi, PUid, Probk, ProbPU, Plink}, 




SUi{i = 1…………….M} sends 
its profile to the sensed PUs 
PU updates its directory 




PU exchanges its profiles 
with other PUs 
 
Figure 4.5: Flow Chart for Profile Exchange 
4.2.2 The First Stage 
In the first stage, a secondary user sends its request for a destination with the required level of 
QoS to each of its sensed PUs. In addition, each sensed PU checks the destination that is 
requested by SU, and checks the availability of spectrum along its path. Each sensed PU also 
checks the QoS level as per SU’s requirements and computes the price according to the 
equations (4.6a or 4.6b). The flow chart of this stage is represented in Figure 4.6. The steps for 
this stage are as shown below: 
 Step 1: checks the availability of the destination  
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 Step 2: check the availability of total spectrum 
 Step 3: checks the SU requirements 
 Step 4: If step 1, 2, or 3 not satisfied, PU sends to SU that the service is not available 
 Step 5: if step 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied, it transfers to the second stage 
Start
SUi{i = 1…………….M} sends its request, for 
destination with the required QoS,  to the sensed PUs 




PU sends to SU, the service is 
not available 
Availability of total 
spectrum????







Figure 4.6: Flow Chart for the First Stage 
4.2.3 The Second Stage 
PUs adjust their price according to equation (4.6) considering other PUs in competition. Each 
sensed PU finally sends this price to SU. The flow chart of this stage is represented in Figure 4.7. 
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It is clear from Figure 4.7 that if there is no other PU, the Ptotal = PPU; otherwise PU must select 
an appropriate value for α. The steps for this stage are as shown below: 
 Step 1: check the intermediate cost CSU, compute f (LQoS), and compute PPU. 
 Step 2: check the number of competitive PUs and obtain α, to compute Ptotal 
 Step 3: compute the price by taking into consideration of other PU 
 Step 4: in step 3, once the Ptotal is computed, it sends to SU 
 Step 5: it transfers to stage 3 
Stage 1






Ptotal = PPU  send 
price PPU to SU
Select appropriate value for 
α, and compute
Ptotal = αPPU  + A
Sends Ptotal to SU
 




4.2.4 The Third Stage 
The SU receives different prices from different PUs and will look for the lowest price for the 
level of the quality of service requested. Finally, the PU accepted allocates the spectrum and 
sends the path address to the SU. Figure 4.8 shows the flow chart for this stage. The steps for this 
stage are as shown below: 
 Step 1: SU sets an initial value for the price (e.g. min = 0) 
 Step 2: SU compares with the received price values; if the value received is less than 
min, the value of min is updated.  
Stage 2
SU receives price from PUI {I=1, 2, 3, ….M}





I = 0 ?
The Min variable is assigned with the total price that 








Figure 4.8: Flow Chart for the Third Stage 
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4.3 Route Management Algorithm 
Algorithm shows the previous stages as pseudo-code, this algorithm describes profiles 
exchange, searching for the destination with QoS requested from SU, and calculating the costs as 
well as the profit.  
Route Management Algorithm 
Parameters: 
//  Profile that shows the channels with SU and parameters related to that channel such as 
bandwidth, PU owner, neighbors, and the probabilities of that channel. 
ProfileSUj (Profileid, SUid, kid, PUid, neighborcount, [neighborid], Probk, ProbPU, Plink, BWk) 
M: the set of SUs 
N: the set of PUs 
K: the set of channels 
U: is the set of nodes in the network 
T_P: profile table for PU 
L = {l1, l2, l3, l4,………., lU}: the set of nodes,  
SUj ϵ M 
PUi ϵ N 
As ϵ L: source node 
SUd: destination node 
V: Array to store the path 
Request (Rid, SUd, f (LQoS)) 
// Rid the request id, SUd is the destination id, and the f (LQoS) is QoS function. 
Response (RPid, V [])  
// RPid is the response profile id, V [] is the array of the intermediate nodes until destination 
 
Functions: 
Save (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6 [], X7, X8, X9, X10), a function to save the parameters of profile 
into profile table. 
SavePU (X11 []), a function to exchange the profiles only among PU  
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Cost1 (X12 []), a function to calculate the price PPU // 1 represents the QoS level 
Cost2 (X13 []), a function to calculate the price PPU // 2 represents the QoS level 
Cost3 (X14 []), a function to calculate the price PPU // 3 represents the QoS level 
InterCost (X15 []), a function to calculate the intermediate cost 
BaseStationCost (X16 []), a function to determine the initial base station cost 
Total (X17 []), a function to calculate the total price Ptotal 
Search (X18, X19 []), a function to find matching entry in the profile table for destination (SUd)  
Check (), a function to check the number of competitive PUs 
Send (), a function to send the price to SU 
Receive (), a function to check if an SU accepts the price. 
Response (), a function to send the response profile from PU to SU, if SU accepts the deal 
// Lines 1-9:  Preliminary Stage 
  1: Begin  
  2:   for each SUj ϵ M 
  3:             // we define for each SU belong to the network a profile called ProfileSUj 
  4:          Save (Profileid, SUid, kid, PUid, neighborcount, [neighborid], Probk, ProbPU, Plink, BWk) 
  5:    end for  
  6:      for each PU ϵ N 
  7:                     // basically, each PU exchange with each neighbor (PU) Profiles 
  8:                    SavePU (ProfilePU) // to exchange the profiles only among PUs 
  9:                end for 
// Lines 10-12: First Stage.  
 10: if Search (SUd, f (LQoS)) = 0 // Search for SUd and available spectrum, 
        // Search for level of QoS requested in profile table 
 11:             Exit () 
 12:         else go to step 14. 
 13: end if 
 
// Now after checking the destination, level of QoS, and availability of spectrum - If all are 
satisfied, the price is calculated and finally it is sent to user.  
// Lines 14-52: Second Stage 
14: if f (LQoS) == 1             // the level 1 of QoS 
                                       // now to find the path we define S: current nodes,  
          // Z: the current sum of Probk 
15   Level1 [] = Probk      // because it is level one so the constraints is saved for  
          //  level one in this array  
15:  for i=1 to W   // W is the number of entries in profile table  
16:                      Z (Li) = 0 
17:                      Z (As) = 1 
18:  end for 
19:  for i1=1 to ∞ 
20:   for i2=1 to W  
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21:   if Z (i2) ==0     // if unknown 
22:                         temp = [temp Level1 (As, i2)] 
23:                                 else  
24:                                        temp = [temp ∞] 
25:   end if    
26:   end for 
27: [A, B] = min (temp)                                 // to store the minimum delay 
28: L = [L A]                                     // to store node for path 
29: temp = [] 
30:  As = B       
31: Z (As) = 1 
32: L = [L As]            
33: if As == SUd          
34: break  
35: end if 
36: end for        // for line 19 
 
// after finding the path, the path will be sent to each function to do the calculation; the functions 
are Intermediate cost and price function. 
37: BaseStationCost (L)            // as per equation 4.1 
38:      InterCost (L)        // as per equation 4.4 
39:     Cost1 (L)      // as per equation 4.3 
40:     Profit = Cost1- BaseStationCost – InterCost // as per equation 4.2 
 
41: else if  f (LQoS) = = 2    // the level 2 of QoS 
 
// the values of level 1 and level 2 are obtained from profile table. 
// Min ∑ (ProbPU / Probk) is calculated through steps from 15 to 36 
  
42: BaseStationCost (L)            // as per equation 4.1 
43: InterCost (L)          // as per equation 4.4 
44: Cost2 (L)        // as per equation 4.3 
45: Profit = Cost2 – BaseStationCost – InterCost // as per equation 4.2 
 
46: else if f (LQoS) = = 3                   // the level 3 of QoS 
 
// the values of level 1, level 2 and level 3 are obtained from profile table 
         // Min ∑ ((ProbPU * ETX) / (Probk) is calculated through steps from 15 to 36 
  
47: BaseStationCost (L)            // as per equation 4.1 
48: InterCost (L)           // as per equation 4.4 
49: Cost3 (L)                    // as per equation 4.3 
50: Profit = Cost3 – BaseStationCost – InterCost // as per equation 4.2 
51: end if 






The following algorithm shows how SU deals with the price received from different PUs. The 
SU sends ACK to the PU of which the price is accepted. After that PU sends the response profile 
which contains the path nodes id. 
                 Route Management Algorithm (SU-Side) 
Parameters: 
// SU receives prices from different PUs. SU compares these prices and decides the one to be 
accepted. 
// Line 1-24: Third Stage 
Q ϵ N: is the sub-set of available PUs 
Ptotal: the total price that is offered to SU 
Min: the temporary variable 
I: a variable to check if SU receives Ptotal from available PUs  
I2: a value indicates the number of elements that belongs to Q 
ID:  the PU who has offered the smallest price. 
Functions: 
Send (C, B), a function to send the acknowledgment to accept the price or not 
// Lines 1-19: To find the smallest price. 
 1: Begin  
 2: for each PUI ϵ N  
 3:         Receive (Ptotal) 
 4:         Min = 0   // initiate the temporary variable 
 5: end for  
 6  for I =0 to N 
 6:  if I >I2 
 7:   Exit () 
 8:  else if I = = 0    
 9:  Min = Ptotal 
10:   ID = PUid 
11:  I = I + 1 
12:  else if Ptotal < Min  
13:  Min = Ptotal 
14:  I = I + 1 
15:  else 
16:  Min = Min 
17:  I = I + 1 
18         end if 
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19:  end if 
20: endif 
21:  
22:   Send (ACK, ID)    // SU sends its ACK to ID 
23:  





4.4 Example: Profile Management and Path Selection 
In this section, a simple example is studied to understand how the calculation and management 
are going on. Hence, there is a network, with two primary users and five secondary users, is 
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                                Figure 4.9: Scenario consists of 2 PUs and 5 SUs 
The stages are as follows: 
 Preliminary stage: It consists of two phases: In the first stage each SU sends its 
profile to the sensed PU, and in the second stage PUs exchange among each other the 
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                                                         Figure 4.10: Profile Exchange  
 In this stage, each PU will create its table as in Table 4.2 and 4.3  
 





 SU1 kPU1 PU1 1 SU2 0.40 0.80 0.85 100 KHz 
SU2
1
 SU2 kPU1 PU1 2 SU1 , SU3 0.40,0.75 0.80,0.95 0.85,0.80 150 KHz 
SU3
1
 SU3 kPU1 PU1 1 SU2 0.75 0.95 0.80 200 KHz 
SU3
2
 SU3 kPU2 PU2 1 SU4 0.80 0.90 0.45 300 KHz 
                                          Table 4.2: Profile lists in PU1 





 SU3 kPU2 PU2 1 SU4 0.80 0.90 0.45 300 KHz 
SU3
1
 SU3 kPU1 PU1 1 SU2    0.75    0.95    0.80 200 KHz 
SU4
1
 SU4 kPU2 PU2 2 SU3,SU5 0.80,0.95 0.90,0.60 0.45,0.90 300 KHz 
SU5
2
 SU5 kPU2 PU2 1 SU4 0.95 0.60 0.90 300 KHz 
                                      Table 4.3: Profile lists in PU2 
 Now after the SUs finish sending their profile, PUs start exchange what they have 








Figure 4.11: Profile Exchange among PUs 
If PU receives a duplicate profile, PU will discard it otherwise the update will be done. If any 
SU request for any connection to specific destination, the search will be processed. So the total 
table for both PU1 and PU2 becomes as follows (Table 4.4): 





 SU1 kPU1 PU1 1 SU2 0.40 0.80 0.85 100 KHz 
SU2
1
 SU2 kPU1 PU1 2 SU1 , SU3 0.40,0.75 0.80,0.95 0.85,0.80   150 KHz 
SU3
1
 SU3 kPU1 PU1 1 SU2 0.75 0.95 0.80 200 KHz 
SU3
2
 SU3 kPU2 PU2 1 SU4 0.80 0.90 0.45 300 KHz 
SU4
1
 SU4 kPU2 PU2 2 SU3,SU5 0.80,0.95 0.90,0.60 0.45,0.90 300 KHz 
SU5
2
 SU5 kPU2 PU2 1 SU4 0.95 0.60 0.90 300 KHz 
Table 4.4: Total profiles in the network for both PUs 
Now if SU1 wants to connect or send packets to SU5, in our example (Figure 4.9) some 
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Figure 4.12: Path1 from SU1 to SU5 
For the path in Figure 4.12, the equations 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 in Chapter3 are used to get the 
following values: Probk = (0.40 + 0.75 + 0.80 + 0.95) / 4 = 0.73, ProbPU = (0.8 + 0.95 + 0.90 + 
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Figure 4.13: Path2 from SU1 to SU5 
Probk = (0.75 + 0.95 + 0.45) / 3 = 0.72, ProbPU = (0.80 + 0.95 + 0.75) / 3 =   0.83 
ETX = ∑ (1 / Plink) = (1/ 0.85) + (1/0.95) + (1/0.75) = 3.56 
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Figure 4.14: Path3 from SU1 to SU5 
Probk = (0.75 + 0.80 + 0.70 + 0.45) / 4 = 0.68, PropPU = (0.80 + 0.90 + 0.70 + 0.95) / 4 = 0.84 
ETX = ∑ (1 / Plink) = 4.90 
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Figure 4.15: Path4 from SU1 to SU5 
Probk = (0.75 + 0.80 + 0.8 + 0.95) / 4 = 0.83, ProbPU = (0.8 + 0.9 + 0.9 + 0.6) / 4 = 0.8 
ETX = 5.56 
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0.95 , 0.60 , 0.90
                                                                           
Figure 4.16: Path5 from SU1 to SU5 
Probk = (0.75 + 0.95 + 0.80 + 0.95) / 4 = 0.86, ProbPU = (0.80 + 0.95 + 0.45 + 0.60) / 4 = 0.70 
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                                                 Figure 4.17: Path6 from SU1 to SU5 
Probk = (0.40 + 0.75 + 0.70 + 0.45) / 4 = 0.58, ProbPU = (0.8 + 0.95 + 0.7 + 0.95) / 4 = 0.85 
ETX = 5.09 
The previous such possible ways are described in Table 4.5 as follows:  
Pathid Probk ProbPU ETX 
Path1 0.73 0.81 5.70 
Path2 0.72 0.83 3.56 
Path3 0.68 0.84 4.90 
Path4 0.83 0.80 5.56 
Path5 0.86 0.70 4.67 
Path6 0.58 0.85 5.09 
Table 4.5: The paths with Values of QoS Levels 
Table 4.5 shows the probabilities for delay and the presence of PU, the last column shows the 
routing metric ETX which is the expected transmission count. The path will be selected based on 
secondary user requirements that are represented by the QoS levels. In our model, the price 
factor, which controls the process, is considered. To satisfy the first level of QoS the second 
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column is referred where this column shows different values of Probk, which represents the delay 
and this value affects the price. In the second column, the best choice is path5 because this value 
represents the probability of idle periods, which means there is not much delay when compared 
with other values but the worst one is Path6. For second level of QoS, the second column and the 
third column are considered. The best choice in terms of probability of PU presence is Path5 and 
the worst choice is Path6. In response to third level of QoS, the best choice is Path1 and the worst 
choice is Path2. When more levels are combined, it is a kind of contradiction to make the choice. 
Following expressions are formulated to help to select the path: 
 Path based on level 1 = Min Probk 
 Path based on level 2 = Min ∑ (ProbPU / Probk  ) among all paths 
 Path based on level 3 = Min ∑ ((ProbPU * ETX) / Probk ) among all paths 
A new table is created, Table 4.6, for all paths based on the above 
Pathid Probk (Probk / ProbPU ) (Probk / (ProbPU * ETX) 
Path1 0.73 0.87 0.24 
Path2 0.72 0.90 0.16 
Path3 0.68 0.81 0.17 
Path4 0.83 1.04 0.19 
Path5 0.86 1.23 0.26 
Path6 0.58 0.68 0.13 
Best choice for level 1 Path5   
Best choice for level 2  Path5  
Best choice for level 3   Path5 
Table 4.6: The best path among possible paths 
4.5 Game Theory Framework for System Model  
Recently, game theory has been used in communication. It has been used to model and to 
analyze resource allocation problems in a competitive area. Game theory is a useful tool that can 
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be used for spectrum management in a cognitive radio network [4-5]. Some existing works 
related to spectrum trading or leasing use one stage of dynamic game structure as in [27], the 
stage was between primary user and secondary user. Other existing works use two stages; one 
stage between primary user and secondary user and the other stage among PUs as in [16, 28, and 
11]. Some other existing works use two stages; one stage between the primary user and 
secondary user whereas the other stage is among the secondary users as in [25 and 47], instead of 
PUs. In this section, the model with game theory concept is introduced. As mentioned above, the 
existing research works consider one stage or two stages. In this work, three stages are 
introduced. The first stage is among the primary users where the Bertrand game is formulated. 
The second stage is between primary user and secondary user where the Stackelberg game is 
formulated, and the third stage is among the secondary users where the Evolutionary game is 
formulated. Three stages are illustrated in the following Figure 4.18 and the game theory 
approaches is connected to layers as in Figure 4.19. 
 
Figure 4.18: Three Stages of Game Theory 
Primary users
Price competition (Bertrand game)
Secondary users
Spectrum competition based on QoS level (Evolutionary game)
Selection the spectrum offered from 
primary user














Figure 4.19: Hierarchy of our Game Theoretic Approach 
In the following sub-sections, the three stages are described that are the Stackelberg game, the 
Bertrand game, and the Evolutionary game. In addition, the utility function is described for each 
user (PU or SU). 
4.5.1 Spectrum Trading using Stackelberg Game (Middle Layer) 
In Stackelberg competition [4], it is assumed that at least one of the firms in the market is able 
to pre-commit itself to a particular level of supply before other firms have fixed their level of 
supply.  Other firms observe the leader’s supply and then respond with their output decision.  
The firms that are able to initially pre-commit their level of output are called the market leaders 
and the other firms are called the followers. The previous concept was applied into our model 
specifically between the primary user and the secondary user. Hence, the primary user is the 
leader and the secondary user is the follower. For leader (PU), QL and IL is defined where QL is 
the strategy set and IL is the information set. For the follower (SU), it has QF where QF is the 
strategy set. According to Stackelberg game model, IL = QF. For any strategy qLo which belongs 
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to QL chosen by the leader, the follower will choose the reaction strategy qF which belongs to QF 
to maximize its own payoff UF. 
         q*F = max UF (qF; qL)                                                                                                   (4.10)                                 
        q*L = max UL (qL; qF)                                                                                                  (4.11)    
In equation 4.10, qL = qLo. After knowing the reaction strategy q*F of the follower, the L will 
announce a strategy q*L which belongs to QL whereas Leader maximizes its payoff UL. In 
equation 4.11, qF = q*F.   
In our model, the primary user strategy set QL is defined as QL = {P
b
i, I = 0, 1, 2,……, N} 
where P
b
i is the total price as in equation 4.6a) and 4.6b) for the allocation of spectrum b. The 
secondary user strategy set QF is defined as QF = {S
j
QoS, j = 1, 2, 3 …M and QoS =1, 2, or 3}, 
where S
j
QoS is the offered spectrum with level of QoS. The primary user is to choose the price Pi 
for the spectrum b while the secondary user would like to select the best size of spectrum with 
requested level of QoS which optimizes its own utility function UF. In this game the PU first 
calculates the most probable response S
r
QoS (r = 1, 2, 3,……m) from the secondary user given 
any of its policies P
b
n (n = 0, 1, 2… N).        




QoS)                                                                            (4.12)    
Equation 4.12 shows that the reaction price is always greater than the initial price, as well as 
the reaction spectrum size with QoS, which is greater than the response spectrum size with QoS.         
4.5.2 Spectrum Competition using Bertrand Game (Upper Layer)        
In Bertrand’s game [4], a firm changes its behavior if it can increase its profit by changing its 
price, on the assumption that the other firms’ prices will remain the same and their outputs will 
adjust to clear the market. When the unit cost of production is a constant c, the same for both 
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firms (e.g. competitive PUs), and the demand is linear, Bertrand’s game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium, in which each firm’s price is equal to c. The previous concept was applied to model 
the competition among primary users. In this competition, k channels are offered by n primary 
users wherein each PUi can offer ki at a cost Ptotal (ki). In our model, the primary users set 
different prices that allow secondary user to select the lowest price among the offered prices. 
Each primary user sets the price based on alpha value as shown in equations 4.8 and 4.9. Each 
PU is looking to maximize its utility (profit) by getting more customers (secondary users).  
4.5.3 Selection strategies using Evolutionary Game (Lower Layer) 
The dynamic competition of spectrum selection among secondary users is modeled as an 
evolutionary game [4]. This is the lower layer in our hierarchical model. This evolutionary game 
was initially developed to describe the behavior of biological agents [78]. It was also used to 
model the behavior of human beings in the society [79] and entities in a market environment 
[80]. The strategy adaption of this game is subject to control from the primary users in terms of 
the size of the spectrum leased to provide spectrum for the secondary users. In addition, the 
primary users observe the spectrum selection of secondary users and decide the spectrum size to 
be leased to SUs dynamically. The secondary user can select the spectrum dynamically 
according to the perceived utility, which depends on the spectrum, the price, and the QoS level. 
A secondary user can access the spectrum from only one PU at a time. The strategy of each SU is 
the selection of the primary user with lower price and better QoS. The utility function of each SU 
is a function of the spectrum, bi, and the price, Pi as discussed in the following section. When the 
utility function is formed for SU, the following concerns are considered; (i) a secondary user 
chooses the primary user that will provide the best spectrum in terms of price and level of QoS 
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and (ii) a secondary user observes the behaviors of other users and changes the decision on 
spectrum selection. 
4.5.4 Utility Function of Primary User and Secondary User    
In [81], the authors have considered the utility function of the primary user as a combination of 
revenues from both data transmission and spectrum trading. This work considers the following; 
the primary user’s utility function consists of five parts: (i) satisfaction of its own transmission, 
(ii) revenue from selling spectrum to the secondary BS, (iii) gain more demands, (iv) the 
corresponding payment due to the intermediate secondary users, and (v) the performance loss 
due to the shared spectrum with the secondary users.        
                          UL = W * log (b) + P * b - f (LQoS)                                                                 (4.13) 
where W is the data transmission rate, b is the spectrum traded, P is the price unit, and f (LQoS) is 
the QoS function. Replacing f (LQoS) from equation 4.3 gives the following: 
                          UL = W * log (b) + P * b – QoSlevel * ln (b)                                                   (4.14)               
QoSlevel is the level of QoS. Secondary user’s utility function consists of the spectrum size and 
the QoSlevel. For SU, the utility function is the following: 
                          UF = W * QoSlevel * log (b) – (QoSlevel)
 2
 * ln (b) * P
2
 * b                            (4.15) 
The derivation of SU’s utility provides the best value of spectrum size in term of QoS. Let 
(dUF / dQoSlevel = 0), you have: 
                                    QoSlevel = (W / (2 * b * P
2
))                                                                       (4.16) 
which means given strategy P chosen by PU, the SU’s best response is to set the QoS level 
QoSlevel as in equation 4.15. Substituting the value of QoSlevel from equation 4.16 in equation 
4.14 for the utility function of PU, you get: 
                            UL = W * log (b) + P * b – (W / 2 * b * P
2
) * ln (b)                                   (4.17) 
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The derivation of PU’s utility gives the best price to SU. The derivation of SU’s utility is 
substituted in the PU’s utility. Now let (dUL / db = 0), you get the following equation in terms of 
P: 






*W*b + W (ln (b) – 1) = 0                                                     (4.18)     
4.5.5 Simulation Result                        
In this subsection, the proposed game theory model is used to examine network dynamics 
under different levels of QoS. Three levels of QoS are introduced as well. This model consists of 
three kinds of game; all the games have a solution called Nash equilibrium. The challenge in 
doing so is that, it is not a priori clear whether Nash equilibrium exists, and there is no standard 
algorithm for finding Nash equilibrium, unlike when each player’s strategy set is finite [79]. 
4.5.5.1 Simulation Parameters 
In the simulation, the cognitive nodes are randomly placed in 300x300 m
2
 and the transmission 
range is set to 150 meters. The length of the packet size is 64Kbit. The total number of channels 
is 15, the transmission rate is 100kpbs, the transmission power is 0.1 watt, the total numbers of 
SUs are 12 users, and the number of PU is 2 users. PU1 has 10 channels and PU2 has the 
remaining 5 channels. The usage period is fixed for all users, and is 6 hours. The number of SUs 
that request channel from PU1 are 7 users and the remaining request channel from PU2. The 
competition factor is calculated for each primary user as per equation 4.9 as well as the constant 
as per equation 4.7 by using the previous parameters. For PU1, the competition factor α1 = 0.517 
and for PU2, α2 = 0.512. The constant A values are A1 = 7 – 1 = 6 and A2 = 5 – 1 = 4. 
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4.5.5.2 Game Solutions 
In this subsection, the Nash equilibrium is obtained for each game in this work. Figure 4.20 
shows the price unit response functions and the Nash equilibrium of the competitive pricing of 
two primary users with fixed spectrum. The figure shows the existence and uniqueness of the 
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Figure 4.20 shows that the slope of the Price unit strategy of 
primary user PU1 is always greater than one. On the other hand, the slope of the Price unit 
strategy of primary user PU2 is always less than one.  
 
Figure 4.20: Existence of Nash Equilibrium 
As a result, there is only one point of intersection, which is called Nash equilibrium. Here, the 
offered price for PU1 is P1
*
 = 9.61873 and for PU2 is P2
*
 = 10.97288. Basically, when one 
primary user changes its strategy, for example the offered spectrum and price unit, the 
equilibrium point to achieve the highest net payoff of the other primary user changes. The best 
response of both primary users in terms of spectrum size is shown in Figure 4.21; the size of the 
offered spectrum in each level is changeable, while the price unit is fixed. If primary user 1 
increases the size of offered spectrum, the demand will be increased by customers (SUs).  




























However, the secondary user observes the other offered spectrum by primary user 2 in order to 
select the best one in terms of QoS and in terms of price. Basically, if the spectrum size is 
increased, that means the total price will be increased, which means the profit will be increased. 
As shown in Figure 4.21, the Nash equilibrium is the intersection between each PU strategy with 
other PU in each level. In Figure 4.21, you have three Nash equilibrium points wherein each 
level has one point. For the sake of simplicity, the only size of the offered spectrum is shown in 
Figure 4.22 and the only spectrum price unit strategies are shown in Figure 4.20. 
 
Figure 4.21: PU1 and PU2 Strategies in different QoS level and the Nash Equilibrium for Each 
The payoff (utility) function of each player in QoS level 1, 2, and 3 is illustrated in Figures 
4.22, 4.23 and 4.24 respectively. It shows that the utility function of PU increases, while channel 
price is increasing. Meanwhile, the strategy of the SU, which is the spectrum size with the QoS 
level to be used, is increasing, and its utility increases as well.  
























PU2 strategy (QoS level = 1 & Price unit = 8
PU1 strategy (QoS level = 1 & Price unit = 8
PU2 strategy (QoS level = 2 & Price unit = 9
PU1 strategy (QoS level = 2 & Price unit = 9
PU2 strategy (QoS level = 3 & Price unit = 10





Figure 4.22: PU and SU Utility in QoS Level 1 
According to the two-dimensional plane indexed by two decision variables, price and spectrum 
size, the PU calculates the equilibrium contract (qL*; qF*) according to equations (4.15), (4.16), 
and (4.17) respectively. Then it waits until the SU announces its policy qF as qF*.  
 
Figure 4.23: PU and SU Utility in QoS Level 2 
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In our simulation, (qL*; qF*) = (11.5; 800) is calculated for first level of QoS, (qL*; qF*) = (13; 
1440) for the second level of QoS, and (qL*; qF*) = (16; 1880) for the third level of QoS. The 
first value represents the best price unit for the PU and the second value represents the best 
spectrum size with QoS level. Note that the utility function of the PU does not achieve maximum 
when price unit = 11.5 in QoS level 1 or price unit = 13 in QoS level 2 or price unit = 16 in QoS 
level 3. However, this point called the Nash equilibrium considers the best response for both 
users, either PU or SU. This point (Nash equilibrium) gives satisfaction to primary user to serve 
maximum customers while its profit is still acceptable. 
 
Figure 4.24: PU and SU Utility in QoS Level 3 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the system overview was introduced; the system model without game theory 
was described as well as the system model with game theory. The routing algorithm was 
presented. Finally, the chapter concluded with a demonstration and discussion by studying a case 
study that showed how the system model worked. In the next chapter, the performance 
evaluation is presented.  
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Chapter 5: Performance Evaluation 
 
In this chapter, the revenue equations are analyzed, algorithms for all equations are presented, 
and the network performance is studied. Finally, the chapter is concluded by comparing the 
proposed algorithms with traditional as well as the recent routing algorithms. 
5.1 Revenue Equations Performance Evaluation 
In this section, the flow chart, algorithm, and simulation results for each equation are 
introduced. 
5.1.1 Base Station Cost (CBS) 
In this subsection, the parameters that affect the base station cost are studied and simulation 
experiments conducted to study their effects. The flow chart of this cost is presented in Figure 
5.1. The parameters that are used to simulate all the model equations are described in Table 5.1.  
Parameter Value 
Bandwidth 5000 bytes/sec 
Available Channel 5 
Price unit 9 
Available Path 6 
Usage period 55 mins 
Number of secondary users 24 




PU requests channels from Base Station
End
Sends CBS  to PU






Calculate the cost as per equation 
4.1                     
Base station assigns channels to PU
 
Figure 5.1: Flow Chart of Base Station Cost 
 
                    Figure 5.2: The Relation between the Base Station Cost and the Time. 
























Figure 5.2 shows that the base station cost increases when the time usage increases, which 
comply with equation 4.1mentioned in Chapter 4.  
5.1.2 Competition Factor (α) 
A new factor, called competition factor is defined to control the behaviors among PUs. The 
flow chart and the simulation results for the equation 4.8 are described. 
Start
PU computes the price PPU
End
Check the other parameters

Ptotal = PPU  send 
price PPU to SU







Ptotal = α PPU + constant. 
Send Ptotal to SU. 
 





Figure 5.4: Relation between Competition Factor and Number of PUs 
Figure 5.4 shows the inverse relationship between the competition factor and the number of 
PUs i.e. if the number of PUs increases the value of decreases. When the number of PUs 
becomes very large, the difference between the values of is small. The reason behind that is the 
cost for level 2 and level 3 in terms of price is more expensive compared to the cost of level 1.    
5.1.3 Intermediate Cost (CSU) 
Intermediate cost is the cost paid by PU to each intermediate node for providing a channel with 
the level of QoS requested. It is defined in equation 4.4. 
Start
PU requests cost CSU from each 
Intermediate for the cost
End
PU calculates its price PPU 
and its profit




Figure 5.5: Flow Chart of Intermediate Cost Process 


























In the initial phase, each SU shares its profile with the corresponding PUs as mentioned earlier. 
The profile contains the available SU channels with their level of QoS. PU updates the directory 
based on profiles. In our model, there is no negotiation between PU and intermediate nodes. 
 
Figure 5.6: Relation between the Intermediate Node Cost and the Spectrum Offered 
Figure 5.6 shows the relation between the intermediate node cost and the requested spectrum. 
The cost as shown is proportional with the requested spectrum and the level of QoS, where the 
highest level of QoS is level 3 with price unit as 15, the intermediate is level 2 with price unit as 
10, and the lowest is level 1 with price unit as 5. 
5.1.4 Price Function 
This function is defined in equation 4.5). In this subsection, flow chart, and the simulation 
results are described. Figure 5.7 shows the steps starting from a SU request until the price is sent 
to the SU. It also shows the steps for calculating the total price. Figure 5.8 shows the relation 





























Level 1, Price unit = 5
Level 2, Price unit = 10
Level 3, Price unit = 15
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between the price and the level of QoS as in equation 4.5). The parameters for previous 
equations are used. 
Start
PU receives request from SU
End




PU classifies the request based on requested 
QoS level




Sends Ptotal to SU
Ptotal = α *PPU+A
 
Figure 5.7: The Flow Chart of Price Equation 
 
Figure 5.8: The Relation between PU Prices with Spectrum Trading for different QoS Levels 










































5.1.5 Profit function: 
This function is defined in equation 4.2). A PU tries to maximize its revenue by getting more 
customers (SUs). However, a PU takes into account many factors such as the other competing 
PUs, the number of SUs, the level of QoS, and the time usage of that spectrum or channel. In the 
previous subsection the parts of profit equation are described. Figure 5.9 describes how to 
calculate the profit at PU. Next, the profit equation is simulated based on the parameters of 
previous equation. 
Start
PU receives request from SU
End
PU checks the availability of destination
No
Yes
PU classifies the request based on requested 
QoS level
Profit =  nk*Ptotal – CBS - CSU
PU calculates Ptotal , CBS, CSU based on the 
requested QoS level 
PU sends the response to the SU
 





Figure 5.10: Relation between PU’s Profit and Spectrum Traded 
Figure 5.10 shows how the profit increases when the level of QoS becomes higher. In addition, 
it is clearly shown, if the primary user maximizes its profit, PU must get more demand from SU 
especially requesting the third level of QoS. Figure 5.10 shows the differences between the 
profits for three levels. The difference between level 1 and level 2 is greater than the difference 
between level 2 and 3. The reason behind that is the price for level 1 is not much cost rather than 
the price for level 2 and level 3. Basically, when you have the path, all the intermediate nodes 
must agree on the level of QoS. Also, the users could be malicious users but this part is 
considered as future work by applying punishment cost for malicious user if any. In addition, the 
billing system is part of future work. 
The section 5.1.1 to section 5.1.5 address all the equations related to this work in terms of flow 
chart, and simulation results. Many constraints to guarantee a reliable and stable service with 
three levels of QoS are proposed. The most researched papers especially for routing in cognitive 
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radio network try to apply traditional algorithms in cognitive radio network, which is not 
efficient at all. However, in this work, it has been attempted to manage the users’ profile, which 
relates to the spectrum aspects in cognitive radio network, to play an important role in 
improving, enhancing, and developing the path provided. In addition, levels of QoS are 
incorporated into this work in order to provide a flexible and dynamic model. Moreover, the 
price model is introduced as well, which plays a vital role in preventing the malicious behavior 
in the network. In the next subsection, the proposed algorithm is compared with traditional 
algorithms (AODV and shortest hop) and recent algorithms (RACON and DORP) in terms of 
delay and throughput. The relation between the profit, the price, and the spectrum size for three 
levels (level 1, level 2, and level 3) of QoS and the profit is maximized as the QoS level becomes 
higher. Here again, the cognitive nodes are randomly placed in 300x300 m
2
 and the transmission 
range is 150 meters. 
Parameter Value 
Bandwidth 1200 bytes/sec 
Transmission Rate 1000 bps 
Base station price unit for level 1, 2, and 3 5, 8, and 11 
The primary user price unit for level 1, 2, and 3 7, 10, and 13 
Total Channel 15 
Requested channels 5 
Number of primary user 15 
Number of PUs 5 
Transmission Power 0.1 watt 
Table 5.2: Simulation Parameters for Figure 5.11 
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Figure 5.11 shows the relation between averages of spectrum traded and average profit within 
the three proposed QoS levels in our model. The figure clearly shows that the profit increases 
when the requested QoS level is higher, where level 3 > level 2 > level 1 in terms of better 
service. 
 
Figure 5.11: PU Profit based on the Level of QoS 
5.2 Comparisons between the Proposed QoS Routing Algorithm with 
Traditional Algorithms and Recent Algorithms  
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed QoS routing algorithm is evaluated. The 
goal of this simulation is to concentrate on the effects of aggregate delay and the throughput in 
comparison with the traditional routing algorithm as well as some of the recent algorithms. 
Basically, routing protocol for mobile cognitive radio networks [44] (RACON) and joint on-





























comparison purposes. In the simulation, cognitive nodes are randomly placed in 300x300 m
2
 and 
the transmission range is 150 meters. In addition, the number of cognitive nodes in CRN is 25, 
whereas the number of PUs is 10 and the number of SUs is 15. Randomly, 5 nodes are selected 
as source nodes, and 5 nodes as destination nodes. The length of the packet size is 64Kbit. In 
addition, the profile’s parameters are the same for any algorithm in the simulation area. The 
simulation results were checked in case of random failures in the path and the results were better 
than the recent algorithms and the traditional algorithms.  
5.2.1 Delay Factor 
The simulation result is shown in Figure 5.12. Regardless of the QoS level used in our 
algorithm, Figure 5.12 shows that the transmission delay of our proposed algorithm is always 
smaller than the traditional routing algorithms as well as the recent algorithms (DORP and 
RACON). This is due to the fact that the traditional algorithms look for minimum hops without 
considering other parameters (e.g. PU presence, node’s mobility, and different characteristics of 
each channel). These parameters affect the delay because the primary user’s presence causes link 
failure which requires more time to find alternative link, the ratio of idle slots to busy slots cause 
more buffering time. 
 
Figure 5.12: Transmission Delay for Different Number of Nodes 




















Tradtional Routing (Shortest Hop)
AODV
Proposed Algorithm (QoS level 1)
Proposed Algorithm (QoS level 2)





We also apply AODV algorithm on cognitive radio network as shown in Figure 5.12 wherein 
the AODV is an on-demand routing protocol. In AODV routing protocol, the secondary node 
must broadcast RREQ packet to all its available neighbor nodes on all available channels. The 
switching delay and the backoff delay is therefore longer than the routing algorithm proposed in 
this work. As shown in Figure 5.12, the recent algorithms give better performance than level 3 in 
the proposed algorithm because the third level in the proposed algorithm considers the link 
robustness and ETX besides the delay. In Figure 5.13, the number of available channels is 
changed. Again, the proposed algorithm is always better than the traditional routing algorithms 
and recent algorithms in terms of delay.  
 
Figure 5.13: Transmission Delay for Different Number of Available Channels 
Clearly, as seen in Figure 5.13, the proposed algorithm is more efficient in terms of delay 
because (i) when the number of available channels is increased, the switching delay and backoff 
will also increase (ii) There is no overhead in the proposed algorithm for link replacement, and 
(iii) the proposed algorithm considers the most important factors that affect the network.  From 
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Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13, it is clearly seen that the proposed algorithm performs better than 
the traditional algorithms and recent algorithms in term of transmission delay.  
5.2.2 Network Efficiency 
In Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15, the proposed algorithm is compared with the recent algorithms 
(DORP and RACON) in terms of throughput and efficiency. The traditional algorithms are not 
compared with the proposed algorithm because the traditional algorithms only consider the delay 
factor in choosing the paths. The throughput referred in Figure 5.14 is obtained in terms of the 
number of total packets received by destination. 
 
Figure 5.14: The Throughput Comparisons between Our Algorithm and Recent Algorithms 
(RACON and DORP) 
The average throughput in relation to time, for the proposed algorithm as well as the recent 
algorithms (RACON and DORP) is plotted in Figure 5.14. This figure depicts the average 
throughput for DORP as decreasing with the presence of PUs as time goes by. Although DORP 
has higher initial throughputs, its average throughput drops very rapidly due to poor management 
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because it does not consider the presence of PU. However, the proposed algorithm is better than 
DORP in all cases, either QoS level 1 or 2 or 3, and the proposed algorithm (level 3) is better 
than RACON in terms of throughput for the following reason; the third level in the proposed 
algorithm considers the ETX and probability of the PU presence, which gives a higher 
throughput. RACON is slightly better than the proposed algorithm (level 2) because of 
RACON’s feature of finding the alternate link in the case of a link failure.   
Figure 5.15 illustrates the degradation of network performance when the probability of a 
primary user’s presence is increased, which is not considered either in DORP or RACON. 
Hence, in our model, by managing all the profiles, channels, and services according to the 
proposed three levels of QoS, the efficiency of the network is improved by our algorithm, as 
shown in Figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.15: The Impact of Primary User Presence on the Network Performance 


















Figure 5.16: The Comparison of Traditional Algorithm and the Proposed Algorithm in terms 
of Efficiency. 
5.2.3 The Role of Spectrum Management in the Network Performance  
In this subsection, the following scenario is to study the effect of spectrum management on the 
network performance. The previous parameters mentioned in Table 5.1, section 5.1.2, and 

















































































Figure 5.17: A Network Consisting of 4 PUs and 9 SUs 
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Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 show the role of spectrum management on the network 
performance in terms of throughput and delay. It is clearly shown that the spectrum management 
gives better results. The spectrum management, which consists of spectrum trading and spectrum 
competition, manages the channels (spectrums) according to the profile received from all 
participating secondary users that ensures higher throughput and lower delay. However, the 
conventional method, as shown in Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19, has unstable values, in that there 
are more link failures that require the replacement of the channel or spectrum. The main reason 
behind this is that the conventional method does not manage the spectrum, which means that it 
does not consider the PUs’ presence. 
 
Figure 5.18: The Role of Spectrum Management on the Network Throughput 
































Figure 5.19: The Role of Spectrum Management on the Delay 
5.3 The Comparison between the Spectrum Management with/without 
Game Theory  in terms of Network Performance  
In this subsection, the comparison between the proposed models in terms of throughput and 
delay is studied. Figure 5.20 and figure 5.21 show the average throughput as well as the average 
delay, respectively. The spectrum management with and without game theory are applied into 
the proposed routing algorithm to analysis the network performance. The network performance 
is better in case of using the spectrum management without game theory because the path will be 
selected as per SUs’ requirement. However, the spectrum  management with game theory is 
more efficient and dynamic in long term because the path will be selected based on the game, 





Figure 5.20: The comparison between the spectrum management with and without game 
theory in terms of delay 
 
Figure 5.21: The comparison between the spectrum management with and without game 
theory in terms of throughput 
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The performance evaluation was studied in this chapter. The proposed algorithm was 
compared with the traditional routing algorithms and the recent routing algorithms. The results 
showed that the proposed algorithm improved the overall network performance and provided 



















Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
The problem of developing an efficient QoS algorithm based on spectrum management in a 
cognitive radio network with game theory application is studied in this thesis. More specifically, 
this research is focused on designing a QoS routing algorithm by trading the spectrum and 
considering the competition among PUs from one side and among SUs on the other side. Two 
models for spectrum management are presented; the first system model is without game theory, 
where the challenge is to find a more dynamic, efficient, and applicable model to express all the 
relations between PUs and SUs by considering all the network elements that could affect the 
price or spectrum or QoS. In the second system model, the game theory concept is incorporated, 
where the challenge is to obtain Nash equilibrium in each game. A Bertrand game is formulated 
to model the competition among primary users in terms of price unit for the offered spectrum 
size. A Stackelberg game is formulated to model the relation between the primary user and the 
secondary user wherein the primary user is the leader and the secondary user is the follower. An 
Evolutionary game is formulated to model the selection competition among SUs. The proposed 
models are incorporated into a proposed QoS routing algorithm in order to improve the network 
performance. The proposed QoS routing algorithm considers the following: (i) different levels of 
QoS (ii) shared profiles among PUs & SUs, (iii) spectrum trading (iv) spectrum competition and 
(v) game theory concept.  
The simulation results show (i) the dynamicity and efficiency of the proposed equations, (ii) 
the Nash equilibrium for each game under different system parameters and under different QoS 
levels, (iii) that when the proposed models are applied into the proposed QoS routing algorithm, 
it is better than the traditional routing algorithms (AODV and Shortest Hop) and the recent 
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routing algorithms (DORP and RACON). Simply, the aggregate throughput, delay, efficiency, 
and the stability of the routes determined by the proposed QoS route algorithm are superior to 
existing wireless routing algorithms. 
6.2 Future Work 
Given that this research is the first research work that combines the spectrum management, 
QoS levels, and game theory for routing algorithm in a CRN, there is still more work to be done. 
This list represents a few open topics and questions. 
 Security: The game theory is used to model the users’ behaviors. It can also be applied 
to suppress selfish and malicious behaviors in these networks to greatly enhance 
system performance. 
 Optimization: The Nash equilibrium does not achieve the highest profit for each 
primary user. The optimal price, which gives the highest profit, could be obtained by 
applying optimization techniques. 
 QoS levels: Three levels are introduced; it can be extended to more levels as well as to 
classify the users to a group based on the level. 
 Complexities: The complexity in terms of location is a nice and attractive topic in 
CRN. It can be considered as a part of future work.     
 Billing System: This work does not consider the payment process, which can be 
extended to have the billing system for base station, intermediate node, primary user, 
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